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ABSTRACT

Corporate law has become unnecessarily complicated. Despite the
proliferation of laws, problems fester and scandals erupt. Something is
wrong. This Article seeks to delayer corporate law-to strip it down to
its essence-and after doing so, offer concrete suggestions for reform. It
is a first step toward a new minimalist architecture for corporate law.

* Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. J.D. Harvard Law
School, M.B.A. Harvard Business School, S.B. Harvard College.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:469

The Article begins by arguing that the core of state corporate lawcorporation statutes and fiduciary duties-currently offers precious little
protection to shareholders. Contractarianism, manifested through
enabling statues, reflects weak economics. Existing fiduciary duties are
little more than rhetorical flourish. Rather than reexamine why the core
of corporate law is empty, policymakers have instead added a series of
layers, most notably securities laws. These reforms, however, merely
operate as bandages to recover from the most recent scandal and further
obfuscate the hollow core of corporate law.
The bulk of the Article offers a fresh path to reform. It draws on
emerging paradigms in regulatory theory to argue that substantively,
corporate law must reinvigorate fiduciary duties by resetting judicial
"standards of review" to match "standards of conduct," while at the
same time addressing the behavior of officers, not just directors. Finally,
the institutional approach proposed is one of cooperative federalism: the
federal government would set minimum standards, but implementation
would occur through state courts via a "reverse-Erie"principle.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Corporate law has become unnecessarily complicated. A rough and
ready measure approximates the problem. When I was a law student a
decade ago, the statutory supplement assigned for our corporations class
consisted of 1223 pages.' A newer edition of the same supplement,
which I now assign when teaching corporations, has 2086 pages 2-a
whopping seventy-one percent increase in just ten years. Add this to any
casebook, and the array of materials is dizzying: state statutes and
common law; federal statutes, regulations, and common law; and a
welter of miscellaneous edicts such as stock exchange listing
requirements, standards of professional conduct, and the usual hortatory
aspirations for corporate governance. Yet despite the extraordinarily
wide swathe of corporate law, problems fester and scandals erupt.
Somehow, this curious state of affairs must be explained.

1. See CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: STATUTES, RULES, MATERIALS, AND

FORMS (Melvin Aron Eisenberg ed.) (1995).
2.

See CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: STATUTES, RULES, MATERIALS, AND

FORMS (Melvin Aron Eisenberg ed.) (2005). The comparison, of course, is not precise, given
editorial choices to add or subtract items. Interestingly, in the face of the unwieldy expansion of
statutory supplements, there has been a recent shift to produce streamlined supplements geared to
individual casebooks. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION: 2005-2006 STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT (2006).
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Perhaps reflecting the evolution of its subject, corporate law
scholarship itself has proliferated. The classic disagreement, whether
corporate law is "racing to the bottom" 3 or "racing to the top, ' 4 has
become a bit quaint. A second strand of scholarship, more
interdisciplinary in its methodology, has emerged. One sub-branch seeks
to apply the insights of public choice theory; 5 the other, learnings from
the economics of industrial organization.6 Concurrently, a third strand of
scholarship has begun, critical in its orientation and advocating
wholesale deconstruction of current doctrine.7 Unfortunately, none of
these theories is satisfactory. The "race to the top" theory suffers from a
host of implausible assumptions-among them, that investors have
perfect information, and that the corporate form does not present
externalities.8 For their part, public choice and deconstruction theorists
do provide a useful critique of existing corporate law paradigms, but too
3. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974) ("The first step is to escape from the present predicament in which a
pygmy among the 50 states [Delaware] prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates national
corporate policy as an incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders, thereby increasing its
revenue."). See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal CorporationLaw": An Assessment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theory of the
Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 290 (1977) ("The liberality of state law is thus evidence, not of
management overreaching, but of the fact that state law has moved in a direction consistent with an
economic model of the management function."); Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a
Problem or Irrelevantfor CorporateGovernance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 212 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 509 (1987) ("Delaware law reflects an internal
equilibrium among competing interest groups."); Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2491, 2496 (2005) ("The interest groups in play differ at each level: shareholders and
managers at the state level, and a wider array of players at the federal level."). For a survey of
public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).

6. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 724 (2002) ("Our analysis suggests that both economic entry barriers
and politics account for state inaction."); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race
or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553,
557 (2002) ("The 'product' currently offered by Delaware should be viewed as including not only
its rules but also its institutional infrastructure, including Delaware's specialized chancery court,
and the network benefits currently enjoyed by Delaware corporations."). For a survey of industrial
organization, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).
7. See, e.g., JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION 110 (2004) (describing corporations as

"institutional psychopaths who lack any sense of moral conviction and who have the power and
motivation to cause harm and devastation in the world"); David A. Westbrook, CorporationLaw
After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 122 (2003)
("Ultimately at stake in corporation law is the degree of credibility-and hence authority-achieved
by a market in a given time and place.").
8. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 4, at 253, 256-57, 266; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The CorporateContract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1421 (1989).
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often they propose little by means of reform. The "race to the bottom"
theory, for its part, while descriptively accurate, typically ends up
proposing a solution that is neither politically feasible, nor even
normatively desirable: the federalization of corporate law. 9
While selectively drawing from much of this scholarship, this
Article is different. It seeks to delayer corporate law-to strip it down to
its essence-and after doing so, offer concrete suggestions for reform. It
represents a small
first step toward a new minimalist architecture for
0
law.'
corporate
I start simply by noting that the central problem of the modem
public corporation-the separation of ownership and control-has not
changed in a century." At their core, laws are trying to structure the
agency relationship between dispersed shareholders ("outsiders") and a
small group of managers ("insiders").12 Somehow, this relationship must
be regulated, but the proliferation of laws makes it woefully clear that
previous attempts have been unsuccessful.
The Article is structured in three principal parts. Part II argues that
the center of state corporate law-corporation statutes and fiduciary
duties-offers
precious
little
protection
to
shareholders.
Contractarianism, manifested through enabling statutes, makes for bad
economics. For its part, existing fiduciary duty doctrine is little more
than rhetorical flourish.
Rather than reexamine why the core of corporate law is empty,
policymakers have instead added a series of layers, most notably federal
securities laws. Part III argues that while these might be useful
specifically to regulate securities transactions, in the context of corporate
governance, they operate merely as bandages to recover from the most
recent scandal-much like an antiquated computer operating system
requires downloading patches to hobble along. On the one hand, these
layers have become a coping mechanism to an empty core. But existing
securities laws operate through different mechanisms to serve a different
9. Different writers have explored variations on this theme. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 3;
Fleischer, supra note 3.
10. Cf JAMES STEELE, ARCHITECTURE TODAY 110 (2001) ("For the true minimalist the
object of all design is to define the true essence of any given piece, whether it be a piece of cutlery,
a gallery space or a house in the landscape.").
11. Indeed, this divergence is central to Berle and Means' seminal text on corporate
organization. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). Cf Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 546-47 (1990) ("1 define 'corporate law' to include
laws-whether made by legislators, judges, or regulators-that primarily govern the relationship
between a company's managers and investors.").
12. See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (2004).
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purpose. More perniciously, layering obfuscates the underlying problem:
the hollow core of empty statutes and weak fiduciary duties.
Part IV offers a fresh path to reform of corporate law. It draws on
two emerging paradigms in regulatory theory and applies them to
corporate law: substantively, confining regulation narrowly only to
"bottleneck" elements within a system; and procedurally, experimenting
with cooperative federalism as an alternative to either dual or preemptive
federalism. I argue that reforming corporate law requires targeting the
"bottleneck": reinvigorating core fiduciary duties by resetting judicial
"standards of review" to match "standards of conduct," while at the
same time focusing on the behavior of officers, not just boards of
directors. Finally, the institutional approach proposed is one where the
federal government would set minimum standards, but implementation
would occur through state courts via a "reverse-Erie" principle.
II. A HOLLOW CORE
Before moving to an analysis of the confusing regulatory layers that
have muddled corporate law, it is first important to understand why these
layers have emerged in the first place. I posit that their emergence can be
explained by the fact that the core of corporate law-corporation statutes
and fiduciary duties-offers precious little protection to shareholders.
Layers, as we shall see in Part III, have become a coping mechanism to
this hollow core.
A.

Empty Statutes

State corporation codes provide the underlying statutory framework
for corporations. These statutes, however, are generally nothing more
than a series of default provisions around which management and
shareholders can theoretically contract. As Mark Roe notes, these codes
reflect the belief "that corporate law is, or should be, the contract that
investors and managers want"13-within this mindset, "[c]ontract law
seems good, and corporate law, which also seems good, is in many
dimensions a special form of contract law."' 4 In the corporate law

13. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics,supra note 5, at 2496.
14. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 262 (2002). As one
commentator points out, the "dominant contemporary view of corporate law is contractarian,
meaning that corporate constituencies are assumed to be best able to determine their mutual rights
and obligations by way of voluntary arrangement." Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics
to Show the Power and Efficiency of CorporateLaw as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
581, 584 (2002).
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vernacular, we live in a world of "enabling statutes."' 5 Needless to say,
the "rationale behind this statutory scheme is that the business of
business is better
left to those in charge of it rather than to judges and
16
legislators."'

The history of how these enabling statutes have emerged, however,
is less auspicious. Over the past century, as states competed for charters,
they did so by offering reduced public regulatory oversight of the
corporation.' 7 As Bernard Black chronicles:
Once states learned that writing flexible rules can increase franchise
tax revenue and writing strict rules is pointless, the course of corporate
law in the twentieth century was predictable ....When one state
innovated by providing new flexibility, others soon followed.
Whatever the pros and cons of this responsiveness, chartermongering
has been with us for a century and isn't about to go away.18
The State of Delaware has best capitalized on the
"chartermongering." When New Jersey heightened its regulatory
restrictions in 1913, many large corporations fled to Delaware's lax
regulatory regime. 19 And Delaware has never looked back. Today, it is
the leading jurisdiction for corporate law where "more than 50% of all
U.S. publicly-traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500" are
incorporated. 20 The state boasts of its "modern and flexible corporate
laws" and "business-friendly State Government."'', Given the loosening

15. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 4, at 216 ("State corporate law is in essence enabling,
following a menu approach that permits firms to alter statutory defaults to fit their needs."); William
W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of CorporateFederalism 6 (European
Corporate Governance Inst. Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 23/2004 and
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Bus., Econ. & Reg. Pol'y, Research Paper No. 606481, 2004),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-606481 [hereinafter, Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium]
("State law's enabling structure is apparent immediately.").
16. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware'sGood Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium,supra note 15, at 15-35.
18. Black, supra note 11,at 549.
19. See, e.g., id. at 548 ("The costs of not meeting corporate desires became all too apparent
when New Jersey tightened its antitrust rules in 1913. Corporations fled to Delaware and other
states, and didn't return when New Jersey repealed the new restrictions in 1917. Delaware did not
repeat New Jersey's mistake.").
20. Delaware Division of Corporations, Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate Home?,
http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml.
21. Id; see also John Gapper, Capitalist Punishment, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2005, at 16
("Indeed, officials make no bones about the importance of attracting companies. 'We are a small
state, so the prestige means a lot to us,' says Ruth Ann Minner, Delaware's governor.").
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of regulatory restrictions that Delaware has hastened, however, some
critics have labeled it "the brothel of corporate law."22
It is unfair, however, to single out Delaware. As Jill Fisch has
pointed out, "state corporation statutes contain relatively little
substantive variation. Careful empirical research reveals that corporate
codes tend toward uniformity. '23 The reason for this consistency is
intimately related to the competition for incorporations: state corporate
codes must be attractive enough both for new local companies to
incorporate at home rather than bear the additional costs of going to
Delaware,2 4 as well as sufficiently attractive for local corporations to
remain in-state rather than reincorporate in Delaware. 25 As Roberta
Romano observes, "a Delaware domicile might not be worth the cost
compared to paying lower fees in a state that has a reasonably up-to-date
statute. An added benefit is that should there be litigation, the defendants
will be less likely to have to bear the additional expense of litigation at a
distance from home., 26 The issue, thus, is not with the Delaware General
Corporation Law per se, but with state corporate statutes in generalmany of whom simply follow Delaware's lead.27
22. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate
Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2003).
23. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2000) [hereinafter Fisch, Delaware Courts]; see also
Romano, supra note 4, at 221 ("Most state codes do not sharply differ either from the Delaware or
Model Act statutes on key dimensions of interest to firms."); Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the
Future ofCorporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 787 (1994) [hereinafter, Loewenstein, SEC]
("[S]tate law does not vary significantly on questions of corporate governance.").
24. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 575 ("[T]he vast majority of firms that
opt for out-of-state incorporation go to Delaware, and firms in each local market are currently
making a choice that is effectively between incorporating in their home state or in Delaware.");
Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First S!ate as
First in Corporate Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 784 (2004) [hereinafter Thompson, Challenges]
("The only relevant race is between Delaware and the home state where a company is located.");
William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 720 (1998) ("The
principal concern of corporate lawyers in states other than Delaware seems to be only that their law
not become so antiquated that corporations are tempted to incur the substantial transaction costs of
moving."). As Carney points out, "[t]o reduce the costs associated with writing a complex corporate
law, many states rely on the Model Business Corporation Act (Model Act) as a source of law
reform." Id. at 725.
25. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 4, at 218 (charter competition is not only about "state
officials' actions to induce foreign corporations to reincorporate from another state" but should also
consider "actions to maintain local firms' domicile in-state").
26. Id. at 219.
27. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443 (1992) [hereinafter
Bebchuk, Federalism] ("Delaware's dominance of the state charter competition has resulted in the
widespread diffusion of its law. Other states, anxious to stem the exodus of corporations from their
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Few, if any, commentators are likely to contest the evolution
toward loose enabling statutes--default rules that can be contracted out
of. The more interesting question, at least historically, has been whether
this competition, or "race" for corporate charters, is a "race to the top" or
a "race to the bottom., 2 8 This question has dominated corporate law
scholarship for decades, so I will be necessarily brief.
"Race to the top" theorists concede the loosening, 29 but view it as
positive. 30 At one level, their argument is Panglossian. They argue, for
instance, that "substituting a mandatory legal rule for bargaining.. . may
impose a cost in the form of the elimination of alternatives which the
parties may prefer,"' that management needs flexibility to "attract
investors away from the almost infinite variety of competing
opportunities, 3 2 or even that "the competition of states in producing
corporate law... has, however modestly, facilitated the reorganization
of the U.S. economy in the last several decades. 3 3 The assertions are
seductive. In his classic article, Ralph Winter argues, for instance, that
there is "no established or even apparent connection between increasing
shareholder power and increasing the yield to investors" 34 and that
"management is not a monolith but a group of persons who individually
have little incentive to see their colleagues shirk or otherwise impair the
corporation." 35 Unfortunately, these bold assertions are made without
adducing evidence.
Digging a little deeper, however, reveals that the intellectual
underpinnings of such an approach can be found in influential law and
economics literature that extols the virtues of private contract; more
specifically, the antiregulatory stance characteristic of the Chicago

jurisdictions, have followed Delaware in adopting various legal rules."); Camey, supra note 24, at
740 ("This evidence suggests that the process of adopting corporate innovations is widespread, with
a strong tendency towards uniformity over time.").
28. The debate, of course, is not confined to corporate law. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz,
RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom " Rationalefor Federal

EnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives,
Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MSNN. L. REV. 447 (1997).
29. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 4, at 254-55 ("No one denies that Delaware's open bidding
for corporate charters has led to a steady lessening of the restrictiveness of state corporation
law ....The history of state corporation law is thus largely a history of drastic reduction of legal
restrictions on management and of the legal rights of shareholders.").
30. See id. at 258-60.
31. Id. at 259.
32. Id. at 257.
33. Romano, supra note 4, at 229.
34. Winter, supra note 4, at 260.
35. Id. at 271.
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School. 36 It is no coincidence that two icons of the Chicago School,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, famously proclaimed that "the
corporate structure is a set of contracts through which managers and
certain other participants exercise a great deal of discretion that is
'reviewed' by interactions with other self-interested actors." 37 As one
commentator notes, the "rhetoric of enablingism is quintessentially that
of free-market and laissez-faire economics. The government should
simply create the context in which private parties can negotiate to their
mutual benefit., 38 Unfortunately, the laissez-faire law and economics
approach, of which "race to the top" theory is a manifestation in the
context of corporate theory, rests on a remarkably shaky foundation. 9
To begin with, "race to top" defenses of enabling statutes suffer
from facile assumptions. First, its theorists extol "corporate efficiency 'A
but cleverly do not define what this means.4 ' Second, they assume that
parties to the corporate contract are rational, perfectly-informed parties
with equal bargaining power42 -conveniently ignoring that a marketbased contractarian approach brings with it all the problems of classical
contract theory.43 For instance, leading commentator Stephen
Bainbridge, asserts that:
Basic economic sense tells us that investors will not purchase, or at
least not pay as much for, securities of firms incorporated in states that
cater too excessively to management. Lenders will not lend to such
firms without compensation for the risks posed by management's lack

36. For example, Ralph Winter's classic article reveals references to articles by Chicago
school theorists such as George Stigler, Harold Demsetz, and Armen Alchian. See, e.g., Winter,
supra note 4, at 258, 271-73.
37. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1418 (1989) ("For debt investors and employees,
everything (literally) is open to contract; for equity investors, almost everything is open to choice.").
38. Kent Greenfield, September 11th and the End of Historyfor Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1409, 1419 (2002) [hereinafter Greenfield, End of History].
39. For a detailed critique of the Chicago school and discussion of new approaches to law and
economics, see Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for
"Critical Legal Economics", 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1155 [hereinafter Dibadj, CLE]; Reza Dibadj,
Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745 (2004).
40. Winter, supranote 4, at 260.
41. For instance, both Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are problematic
measures of social welfare. See Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming
2006).
42. See, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Team Productionand the Progressive CorporateLaw Agenda,
35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 667, 679-80 (2002).
43. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 625-26 (1983) ("A regime of contract is just another legal name for a market. It ceases to
exist when inequalities of power and knowledge accumulate to the point of turning a set of
contractual relations into the outward form of a power order.").
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of accountability. As a result,
those firms' cost of capital will rise,
44
while their earnings will fall.
Empirical research, however, confirms that those who invest in
markets rarely even consider where a firm is incorporated.45 Similarly,
race to the top theorists are fond of claiming that states compete for
citizens the way they do for firms and investors.46 Their assertion,
however, is predicated on Charles Tiebout's famous hypothesis that the
''consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best
satisfied his preference pattern for public goods. 47 Tiebout's work,
however, is only a hypothesis based on a welter of unrealistic
assumptions
predicated
on consumer-voters
having perfect
information. 48 As William Bratton and Joseph McCahery observe, the
"Tiebout model, viewed in isolation, provides no basis for predicting
that competitive behavior by government leads to optimal preference
matching.'49
Third, contractarians conveniently assume that the corporate
"contract" is a self-contained instrument that does not impose
externalities. 50 Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, state that "firms
and managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper relative
to others. Because the choices do not generally impose costs on strangers
to the contracts, what is optimal for the firms and investors is optimal for
society." 51 Similarly, Roberta Romano claims that "[s]uch externalities
are rarely produced in corporate law, which concerns managershareholder relations. That is precisely at the core of charter
competition." 52 Of course, corporations can impose externalities on other
stakeholders such as employees, customers, and communities.5 3 Part IV
44.

Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring

2003, at 26, 30.
45. See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of
Investors'Reactionsto "Changes" in CorporateLaw, 75 CAL. L. REv. 551 (1987).

46. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 4, at 216.
47.

Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418

(1956).
48. See id. at 419.
49. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition:Devolutionary Federalismin a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 230 (1997).

50. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1421; Winter, supra note 4, at 253.
51. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1421.
52. Romano, supra note 4, at 226.
53. See, e.g., Greenfield, End of History, supra note 38, at 1419 ("Because the law largely
stands aside in the formation of the corporate governance 'contract,' the parties with power, the
shareholders and managers, can largely agree to whatever arrangement will benefit them. They can
externalize the cost of the contract onto those who have less power to do anything about it.").
Unsurprisingly, state competition in other contexts also imposes similar externalities. Cf Susan
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will argue, however, that incorporating such concerns into corporate law
may be counterproductive. The more important point for our purposes is
to recognize that enabling statutes allow corporate "insiders"--directors
and officers-to impose externalities on shareholders who face
imperfect information and a host of collective action problems.54
Fourth, if all else fails, "race to the top" theorists argue that the
capital and labor markets will discipline managers.5 5 Winter notes, for
example, that "if a firm is mismanaged, robbed, or overly attentive to
nonprofit goals, the price of its shares will drop and others will perceive
an opportunity to take over the corporation and install new and more
efficient management to raise the share price. 56 As Mark Loewenstein
observes, insiders often "have other incentives than to maximize the
firm's ability to raise capital-namely, to retain and enhance their
positions within the firm, even if the policies they choose adversely
affect the firm's ability to raise capital., 57 More generally, as Bernard
58
Black notes, such market discipline theories can be "just plain silly.
These concerns have been borne out in an era replete with corporate
scandals and grossly excessive executive compensation. To add insult to
injury, state corporate charters conveniently lose their "enabling"
characteristic when they impose prohibitions on takeovers.
Contractarianism is apparently not good enough when protecting
insiders. 59 As William Bratton and Joseph McCahery summarize:

Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1345 (1983)
("States may compete for business and population and seek to impose external costs-such as air
and water pollution or taxes-on residents of other states.").
54. Cf Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 2 ("Externalities do occur
because Delaware's strategy structurally favors management on allocational questions.").
55. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1475-77
(2005); Note, The Case for Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2726,
2727-28 (2005).
56. Winter, supra note 4, at 266. The roots of this approach lie in an article by the prominent
agency theorists Jensen and Meckling. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305

(1976). For a critique of agency theory, see Dibadj, supra note 55, at 1473-81.
57. Loewenstein, SEC, supra note 23, at 810.
58. Black, supra note 11,at 579.
59. Of course, the inconsistency goes well beyond state antitakeover statutes. Kent Greenfield
observes:
Indeed, it is more than a bit ironic that the contractarian, free-market rhetoric is so strong
within corporate law scholarship, when so few firms, executives, or shareholders would
sign on to such rhetoric outside the limited area of corporate governance. To be sure,
corporations depend mightily on government assistance to survive and make money. I
am speaking not only of the billions of dollars a year that go into export subsidies, price
supports, tax concessions, and other examples of "corporate welfare." I refer also to the
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The market-based race to the top validation of state law had bypassed
the problem of shareholders' lack of influence over state lawmaking
with a reference to the control market deterrent. The assertion, in
effect, was that the managers' option of exit adequately disciplined the
states, while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a hostile
offeror adequately disciplined the managers. The collaboration of
managers and state politicians to hamper the60 market deterrent
presented a manifest case of charter market failure.
"Race to the top" theorists are, of course, at a loss to explain this chilling
irony. As Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell observe, "supporters of state
competition are unable to square their position on state competition with
their views on the type of takeover regulation that maximizes
shareholder value., 61 Framed more broadly, "even the most outspoken
proponents of the race-for-the-top theory have been forced to
acknowledge that states do not always enact optimal corporate laws. 62
Quite apart from any economic debates, the weakness of corporate
statutes perhaps becomes most evident if we simply look at how the laws
are made. Even "race to the top" theorists, who proudly point to the fact
that state corporate codes are frequently updated,63 acknowledge that the
"critical factor for the working of the charter market is the role of the
local corporate bar and their clients." 64 One commentator well familiar
with the drafting process summarizes a poorly kept secret within
corporate law circles, that "[a]t least two interest groups benefit from
modem corporate laws-local corporate lawyers and managers of firms
incorporated within a state." 65 Proposals from these private groups, often

very infrastructure of the market, which is in large part a creation of government and
government regulation.
Greenfield, End of History, supranote 38, at 1420-2 1.

60. Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supranote 15, at 29.
61. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, The Race to ProtectManagersfrom Takeovers, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1168, 1193-94 (1999); see also Fisch, Delaware Courts, supra note 23, at 1067

("Romano and other scholars in the Winter camp agree that state antitakeover regulation
inefficiently interferes with the market for corporate control, yet these scholars are unable to
reconcile this inefficiency with their defense of regulatory competition.").
62. David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REv. 471, 530 (1994).

63. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 4, at 216 ("Delaware attentively updates its code, issuing
frequent revisions on technical as well as substantive matters almost on an annual basis.").
64. Id. at 13.
65. Carney, supra note 24, at 716. Carney's experience includes "more than ten years serving
as a reporter, member, and chair of a state bar committee concerned with changes in corporate law."
Id. at 748. Carney explains the presence of state antitakeover statutes in similar terms. See id.at
751-52 ("On the whole, however, all corporate managers feel they may be potential takeover
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acting through bar committees, are then adopted as a matter of course by
the legislature.6 6 Shareholders are conspicuously absent from the
calculus.67
This troubling pattern repeats itself not only in Delaware,68 but also
in other states. 69 As Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar write, "states
occasionally take actions, such as revising their corporation codes, that
have the incidental effect of making them more attractive as corporate
domiciles. But they take these actions largely to satisfy political
constituents, such as owners of local close corporations or managers of
local public corporations. 7 ° Overall, as Jill Fisch observes, the "result of

targets, while a much smaller number also view themselves as potential bidders. Thus, lawyers can
be expected to reflect this bias of their corporate clients and not oppose these laws.").
66. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Our Corporate Federalism and the Shape of
CorporateLaw 19-20 (University of Pennsylvania Law Sch. Inst. For L. & Econ. Research Paper
No. 04-12 & New York University Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series Working Paper
No. 04-020, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-564685 (forthcoming VAND. L. REV.)
("Although formally adopted by the legislature, Delaware's elected representatives have no
significant role in the crafting of Delaware's statutory corporate law. It is the Council of
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association, rather than a legislative committee, that
prepares drafts of proposed amendments to the General Corporation Law."); William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and CorporateSelf-Regulation,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1888-89 (1995) [hereinafter Bratton & McCahery, Regulatory Competition]
("Delaware delegates to its bar association both agenda control and drafting responsibility for any
amendments to its corporate code."); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law
Federalism,30 IOwA J. CORP. L. 99, 118 (2004) [hereinafter McDonnell, Two Cheers] ("[l]n most
states, the only well-organized groups that care about corporate law are corporate managers and
corporate lawyers. The latter group dominates the lawmaking process and the state legislature often
rubberstamps changes proposed by the corporate bar.").
67. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of CorporateLaw, 57 SMU L.
REV. 353, 384-85 (2004) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Transformation] ("Shareholders have not yet
become effective lobbyists at the state level, while corporate management has been for a long time.
State legislators respond to a CEO who might threaten to move corporate offices outside of the
state, but not to a shareholder who threatens to dump her shares.").
68. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 2 ("Statutory amendments to the [Delaware]
corporation law are initially drafted by a bar committee, are adopted without change and debate by
the legislature, and address largely technical and non-controversial matters."); Roe, Delaware's
Politics, supra note 5, at 2501 ("Bar advisory committees do propel the Delaware legislature, but
the Delaware bar typically represents managers and investors (as well as themselves)."); Macey &
Miller, supranote 5, at 515 ("[T]his equilibrium is likely to be strongly biased in favor of the bar.").
69. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 705 ("The driving force behind many
corporate statutes is corporate lawyers."); Loewenstein, Transformation, supra note 67, at 383
("While lawyers on law revision committees try to 'do the right thing,' they typically represent
corporate officers and directors.").
70. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 701; see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 606
("The bar usually plays a significant role in choosing and changing the state's corporate law rules.
The interests of local law firms lie in having a corporate law system that is sufficiently attractive for
incorporation by local firms that they have as clients. These law firms would wish to avoid a system
that would force out-of-state incorporation. The other group consists of firms located in the state
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this political influence is legislation that uniformly favors the interests of

corporate management."'" Corporate statutes, the product of private
lobbying,7 2 are predictably empty as public policy tools. They are an
73
example of a "regulatory giving.,
In sum, the metaphor of corporate law as contract is especially
weak. As Joel Seligman summarizes:
First, there is no formal written contract to that effect between
common shareholders and managers, no negotiating process, no
volition on the part of the shareholders to such a contract, nor consent
to it. Second, modem investment theory, particularly "portfolio"
theory, posits that investors can diversify virtually all firm-specific
risk ....To the extent that portfolio theory is adopted by major
investors, it eliminates any incentive to negotiate a contract with
managers. Third, it is reasonable to assume that most shareholders
would view federal securities fraud and state corporate law and
derivative actions-rather than a hypothetical contract-as their basic
protection against managerial misconduct .... [T]he agency costs
theory can be criticized on a fourth ground: its indeterminance. Once it
is conceded that market forces are imperfect under certain
circumstances, such as takeover contests in which managerial conflicts
of interest are particularly acute, the analytical utility of both the
nexus-of-contract and the agency-cost theories is significantly
74
eroded.

The idea that contractarianism, manifested here through enabling
statutes, makes for good corporate law is simply bad economics.

and their managers."); Carney, supra note 24, at 755 ("Rather than refer to a competition among the
states, it may be more accurate to refer to a competition among localized interest groups.").
71. Fisch, Delaware Courts, supra note 23, at 1095.
72. Cf Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594 (2003) ("This
public indifference to the actual corporate law rules allows for something akin to organized private
lawmaking among the corporate players.").
73. For a discussion of how a regulatory giving can create an anticommons, see Reza Dibadj,
Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041 (2003).
74. Joel Seligman, The Casefor FederalMinimum CorporateLaw Standards,49 MD. L. REV.
947, 948-49 (1990) [hereinafter Seligman, Minimum Corporate Standards]; see also Victor
Brudney, CorporateGovernance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1403, 1420 (1985) ("[I]nvestors in large publicly held corporations have little or no ability to choose
or negotiate the terms of management with original owners who go public or with corporate
management; and their understanding about the looseness of management's obligations is
problematic."); Michael Klausner, Corporations,Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757, 759 (1995) ("[T]he contractarian paradigm provides an incomplete account of the
role of corporate law and the process by which states compete to sell corporate charters."). For a
broader critique of contractarianism as a theory of the firm, see Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm,
supra note 55.
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Weak FiduciaryDuties

As Robert Clark notes in his treatise, the fiduciary principle is

"[c]orporate law's major conceptual contribution"75 to addressing the
problem of managerial discretion. After all, courts could impose strong
fiduciary duties to regulate, ex post, corporate behavior. Not only would
these duties help compensate for empty enabling statutes, but they could
provide "a set of standards to restrain insiders in exercising their

discretionary power over the corporation and its shareholders in
contingencies not specifically foreseeable and thus over which the
parties could not contract., 76 Perhaps most importantly, fiduciary
duties-such as the duty of care and duty of loyalty-represent
responsibilities that corporate actors should not be able to contract
around, given a recognition that the "common law simply could not live

with an 7unfettered freedom of contract because of the abuses that might
7

occur."

But how robust are these fiduciary duties? To address this question,
I focus on Delaware for two reasons. First, given the centrality of
Delaware to corporate law,78 its cases are highly influential. Second, its
case law is richer than that of other states: even though "corporate law
seems to vary little from state to state," 79 Delaware courts have crafted
their fiduciary duties as a matter of common law with little legislative
guidance. 80 The analysis will show that fiduciary duties in corporate law
are in fact little more than eloquent rhetorical flourish.

75. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW xxiii (1986).
76. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The MandatoryStructure of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549,
1593 (1989). Cf Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1102 (1997) ("[T]he Delaware legislature and courts cannot promulgate ex
ante the standards to govern new situations until they see a variety of cases and figure out how well
or badly people behaved.").
77. Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's
Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 497, 537 (2000) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Cary'sPolemic).
78. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
79. McDonnell, Two Cheers, supra note 66, at 109; see also supra Part II.
80. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 13 ("The most noteworthy trait of Delaware's
corporate law is the extent to which important and controversial legal rules are promulgated by the
judiciary, rather than enacted by the legislature."); Fisch, Delaware Courts, supra note 23, at 1074
("[T]he interpretation and application of these fiduciary principles is the heart of corporate law, yet
the Delaware statute provides almost no guidance on the subject."); McDonnell, Two Cheers, supra
note 66, at 129 ("Delaware can rely on its courts to provide more guidance for corporations,
whereas states adopting the MBCA [Model Business Corporation Act] tend to have less developed
case law.").
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It is useful to begin by understanding the conventional wisdom.
Delaware is effusive in its praise of its court of first instance for
corporate matters:
The Delaware Court of Chancery is widely recognized as the nation's
preeminent forum for the determination of disputes involving the
internal affairs of the thousands upon thousands of Delaware
corporations and other business entities through which a vast amount
of the world's commercial affairs is conducted. Its unique
competence
81
in and exposure to issues of business law are unmatched.
Indeed, distinguished commentators praise the "expertise and
efficiency of the Delaware judiciary, 82 and the "greater and more
balanced access to the lawmaking process, increased political
independence, and enhanced decision-making transparency" 83 that
Delaware's courts can provide. Some argue that the advantage "that
Delaware offers corporations is a highly developed case law that
provides not only a useful set of precedents, but also a substantial degree
of certainty about legal outcomes. 8 4 While applauding the procedural
efficiency of the Delaware courts, I argue that the fiduciary standards
that its courts promulgate are muddled and ultimately weak.
I begin with the two duties most familiar to students of corporate
law: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires
corporate directors and officers to behave as a reasonably prudent person
would under the circumstances. 85 At first blush, this standard might
appear akin to a tort-like negligence standard. However, courts have
watered down the duty of care through the "business judgment rule"
81. Welcome to the Delaware Court of Chancery, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Court%20o/of2OChancery/.
82. Loewenstein, Cary's Polemic, supra note 77, at 505-06 ("The Delaware Chancery
Court... hears approximately 500 business-related cases a year. The Chancery Court resolves these
cases promptly, and its decisions are rarely appealed. Only five percent of its decisions are appealed
to the state Supreme Court... and in those appeals the Supreme Court upholds the Chancery Court
in seventy-five percent of the cases."); Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 24 ("The chancery court is
well-funded, enjoys wide respect, resolves disputes speedily, and probably accounts for the fact that
Delaware's overall court system is ranked first among all states. If needed, appeals from the
chancery court are heard by the Delaware supreme court quickly and decided instantaneously after
oral argument.").
83. Fisch, DelawareCourts, supra note 23, at 1099.
84. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 484. Cf Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 725 (An
"important advantage that Delaware offers is its extensive and widely known corporate case law.").
85. See ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (1992). The ALl, for example,
suggests that a director or officer is required to act "(1) in good faith, (2) in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in best interests of corp., and (3) with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably expect to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances." Cf REV. MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.30 (2002).
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("BJR") which presumes that "in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis.., and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company., 86 The BJR "operates to preclude a court from imposing itself
unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation., 87 In effect,
the BJR shifts the duty of care from negligence to gross negligence:
a
violations are found only where there is "reckless indifference to or 88
stockholders"
of
body
whole
the
of
interests
the
of
disregard
deliberate
or "actions which are without the bounds of reason., 89 As three current
and former prominent Delaware judges themselves admit, the BJR "is
not, functionally speaking, a standard of review at all. Rather, it is an
expression of a policy of non-review of a board of directors' decision
when a judge has already performed the crucial task of determining that
certain conditions exist." 90
Amusingly enough, in the rare instance where the Delaware
Supreme Court found directors to have behaved in a grossly negligent
manner, 9 1 the Delaware legislature subsequently permitted corporations
to contract out of even gross negligence, at least as to monetary
liability. 92 Put simply, the current duty of care is anemic at best. As one

commentator summarizes:
A director is only liable if he or she is grossly negligent, and the rule
presumes that the director acted with due care ....

If the company has

an exculpatory provision in its articles of incorporation, as nearly all
publicly-held corporations do, the plaintiff-shareholder must prove that

86. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
87. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
88. Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929).
89. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974). As Mark Roe has noted, the
BJR "has courts refusing to directly help shareholders who attack managerial mistake." Roe,
CorporateLaw's Limits, supranote 14, at 235.
90. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standardsof Review in Delaware CorporationLaw, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 870
(2001); see also Sean J. Griffith, GoodFaith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 34 (2005) ("Process review is, of course, duty of care
review."); Kostant, supra note 42, at 677. For a general critique of the BJR, see Franklin A.
Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or MisguidedNotion?, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 287 (1994) [hereinafter Gevurtz, BJR].
91. See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985).
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004); see also Roe, CorporateLaw's Limits,
supra note 14, at 243 ("One does not exaggerate much by saying that American corporate law has
produced only one major instance in which nonconflicted managers were held liable to pay for their
mismanagement: Smith v. Van Gorkum, a decision excoriated by managers and their lawyers, and
one promptly overturned."); Black, supra note 11, at 584 ("But if courts stray too far from what
companies want, the state legislature will change the law or companies will move elsewhere.").
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the director failed to act in good faith or intentionally harmed the
corporation. As if these legal standards were not enough to reduce a
director's incentives to act with care, directors invariably have
indemnification rights and insurance, and courts have limited the
ability of shareholders to 93obtain discovery in derivative actions
alleging director misconduct.

The duty of loyalty can have a little more bite, but not much. While
corporate law allows self-dealing transactions, 94 the duty of loyalty
"mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders
take precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer, or
controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally. 9 5
Savvy insiders, however, recognize the way around this duty: approval
from an "independent" body-shareholders or the board, or even a
committee composed of "disinterested" board members.96 Some
corporate codes even provide so-called "strong" safe-harbor statutes
immunizing approved transactions from any fairness inquiry; 97 more
importantly, jurisdictions such as Delaware that scrutinize such
approved transactions for fairness despite the statutory language, 98
nonetheless employ a loose standard. 99 Much of this laxity is likely
driven by the influence of Chicago School law and economics.1 00
Some will no doubt object to this characterization of the duty of
loyalty, arguing that courts do scrutinize controlled transactions more
rigorously. 10 1 Perhaps at the margins, but a skeptic might be forgiven
here as well. Delaware courts, for instance, putatively ratchet up scrutiny
by creating convoluted standards such as "intrinsic fairness" 10 2 or "entire

93. Loewenstein, Transformation,supra note 67, at 377.
94. See Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundationof CorporateLaw, 27 IowA J. CORP. L.
333, 334 (2002) ("[Tlhe decisional law has recognized a relaxation of the rigor of trust law,
primarily with respect to tolerance of self-dealing transactions.").
95. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
96. See, e.g., Walsh, supranote 94, at 334.
97. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.6 1(b)(3) (2002).
98. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2004).
99. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997);
In re Wheelabrator Techs., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995); Cookies Food Prods. v. Lakes
Warehouse, 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988).
100. Consider, for instance, Easterbrook and Fischel's somewhat startling claim that "if
corporate law should forbid managers to divert corporate opportunities to themselves, they might
respond by drawing higher salaries or working less hard to open up new business opportunities."
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at1433.
101. Cf Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33
HOFSTRA L. REv. 176 (2004).
102. See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
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fairness."'' 0 3 These standards, though, are problematic on two
dimensions. First, they are unnecessarily Byzantine: rather than
requiring proof of causation as is done elsewhere, they shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. Second and much more importantly, they have
little bite. Predictably, their application has been lax, 104 permitting
corporations to sidestep enhanced scrutiny by jumping through the
requisite procedural hurdles-notably by structuring deals in ways that
elude "fairness review," 10 5 or establishing a special committee to
approve the transaction.10 6 Even if we assume, arguendo, that these
standards are meaningful, they do cabin state corporate law to a
remarkably narrow arena. As Robert Thompson reminds us:
Delaware litigation is surprisingly limited in the types of issues
resolved. The cases are overwhelmingly focused on acquisitions and,
particularly, conflict of interest in acquisitions. This litigation pays
some attention to conflicts of interest elsewhere and certain statutory
cases, yet the overall picture focuses on a few discrete areas of
corporate governance that are more limited and occur more
than might be expected for a plenary governance
sporadically
07
system. 1

Perhaps shockingly given its limitations, the duty of loyalty is
nonetheless the strongest fiduciary duty.
Other duties-waste, candor, and good faith-are even weaker.
Showing "waste" is an unusually difficult hurdle to clear, since plaintiffs
must prove "an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has
received adequate consideration."' 0 8 The duty of candor (or
disclosure)-which at least according to one Delaware case "obligates
directors to provide the stockholders with accurate and complete
information material to a transaction or other corporate event that is
being presented to them for action"109-is unlikely to be an independent
duty at all, since it derives merely "from the combination of the

103. See generally Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
104. See generally Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
105. See, e.g., In re Siliconix, Inc., No. 18700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83 at *24 (Del. Ch. June
19, 2001) (holding that minority freezeouts done via tender offer [are] not subject to "fairness"
review).
106. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983); In re W. Nat'l
Corp., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000).
107. Thompson, Challenges,supra note 24, at 788 (emphasis added).
108. Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993).
109. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
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fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith."'1 ° To boot, it is
eclipsed by federal disclosure obligations under the securities laws."'
Finally, what about the duty of good faith? Sean Griffith argues, for
instance, that the duties of care and loyalty
overlap as both seek to answer the fundamental question of whether a
particular decision or a particular transaction are beneficial to the
corporation. Whether the question is confronted from the angle of the
duty of care or the duty of loyalty is just a difference in approach. To
put it another way, the fundamental question underlying both duties
really is good faith. Are the directors doing their best in acting for
someone else? Arguably, that is the only question in all of corporate
112
law. It is simply asked in different ways in different contexts.

But Griffith's careful analysis reveals that while "the precise
meaning of good faith remains unclear,"' 1 3 "the emerging duty of good
faith is best understood as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive
standard."' " 4 Thus, to the extent that the duty of good faith can even be
categorized as a separate duty, it too devolves into the procedural tricks
of care and loyalty." 5 In addition, recent Delaware case law suggests
that to be held liable, plaintiffs must show that defendants intentionally
acted in bad faith."t 6 Thus, to the extent
an independent duty of good
7
faith even exists, proving it is difficult." 1

110. Id.at1l.
111. For a discussion of the duty of disclosure, see Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Moral Basis of
State Corporate Law Disclosure, 49 CAT. U. L. REV. 697 (2000); Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The CorporateDirector's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1087 (1996).
112. Griffith, supra note 90, at 47 (emphasis added). But see William A. Gregory, The
FiduciaryDuty of Care: A Perversion of Words, 38 AKRON L. REV. 181, 183 (2005) ("Equating the
duty of care with the duty of loyalty is bad law and worse semantics.").
113. Griffith, supra note 90, at 30.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Cf In re Walt Disney Co., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *169 (Del. Ch. Aug.
9, 2005) ("Decisions from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery are far from
clear with respect to whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of good faith.").
116. See id. at * 175 ("[Ihe concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard
for one's responsibilities,is an appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining whether
fiduciaries have acted in good faith."). Indeed, if good faith were read broadly, it would eviscerate
the exculpation provisions in Delaware § 102(b)(7) which does not protect defendants who either
violate the duty of loyalty or act in bad faith. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004).
117. Some scholars suggest building on the duty of good faith to fashion reforms in corporate
law. Notably, Hillary Sale analogizes good faith to the scienter requirement in securities fraud cases
and argues that the duty of good faith "holds considerable promise for creating incentives to instill
effective corporate governance and preventing the kind of fiduciary abdication that has occurred."
Sale, supra note 16, at 462.
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Generalizing from an analysis of specific fiduciary duties,
Delaware's opinions overall reveal two related and striking features:
fuzzy standards prone to litigation, but ultimately ineffectual remedies.
As Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani note, "Delaware courts avoid
providing bright-line guidance to corporate actors, relying instead on a
set of loosely defined tests."'" 18 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock point to
the loose notion of stare decisis that such fuzzy standards enable:
[T]he Delaware Supreme Court rarely overrules its own precedents.
Instead, it tends to justify a ruling that is in tension with precedent (of
which there have been a fair share) by explaining that generalsounding rules announced in earlier cases apply only to a much
narrower set of circumstances or attributing any misunderstanding by
lawyers or lower court judges to their failure to read supreme court
precedent carefully. 119
In such nimble and unconstrained hands, seemingly heightened
scrutiny later gets interpreted as a more deferential standard. 120 As
William Bratton and Joseph McCahery observe, the Delaware "courts
garnered publicity in a handful of highly-publicized cases, ruling against
management and announcing vague standards that held out the prospect
of shareholder value enhancement. But in less well-publicized
subsequent cases, they used the camouflage of complex facts to refrain
12
from applying the standards in management-constraining ways." '
These maneuvers feed weak remedies: injunctions are rare, monetary
damages even rarer.' 22 Predictably, "a characteristic style of Delaware
law... [is the]
denial of a preliminary motion coupled with strong
123
criticism.'
The big picture that emerges, thus, is one filled with rhetoric but
low on substance. Empirical evidence even suggests that investors "seem
to consider the Delaware courts' decisions to be inconsequential as
regards shareholders' wealth and, by implication, largely iihdeterminate

118. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 601; see also Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory ofIndeterminacy in CorporateLaw, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1915 (1998).
119. Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 18-19.
120. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (articulating a "reasonable in relation to the threat posed"
standard apparently somewhere between BJR deference and entire fairness) with Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385-86 (Del. 1995) (loosening the Unocal standard to something
akin to BJR).

121. Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium,supra note 15, at 62.
122. See, e.g., id. at 63.
123. Rock, supra note 76, at 1103.
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of the outcome of future cases. 124 As Edward Rock chronicles in his
detailed study of how Delaware corporate law is actually created:
the Delaware courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of
conduct (which influence the development of the social norms of
directors, officers, and lawyers) largely through what can best be
thought of as "corporate law sermons."... [W]e come much closer to
understandingthe role of courts in cororate law ifwe think ofjudges
more aspreachersthan aspolicemen.

Rock argues "that we should understand Delaware fiduciary duty
law as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad managers and
' 26
directors, tales that collectively describe their normative role."'
The recent and eagerly anticipated Walt Disney case127 provides a
particularly vivid illustration of Rock's point. The case is interesting not
so much for its predictable holding128-that the Disney board did not
violate its fiduciary duties with respect to Michael Ovitz's $140 million
severance package-but for its rhetoric. 129 The Chancery court did not
find the duties of care, 130 loyalty,' 3 1 or good faith 132 were violated

because the Disney board was careful enough to jump through the
requisite procedural hoops. Even more interesting is to dwell on how the
opinion unravels into a morality tale. For example, the court teaches us
that:
Delaware does not-indeed, the common law cannot-hold fiduciaries
liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best
practices ....Indeed, other institutions may develop, pronounce and
urge adherence to ideals of corporate best practices. But the
development of aspirational ideals, however worthy as goals for
124. Weiss & White, supra note 45, at 603.
125. Rock, supra note 76, at 1016 (emphasis added); see also Kamar, supra note 118, at 1942
(noting that Delaware judges "often take a preaching stance toward the business community").
126. Rock, supra note 76, at 1106.
127. See Inre Walt Disney Co., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,2005).
128. See also Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World's Most Expensive Raincoat, 34
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1131, 1132 & n.2.
129. For a similar example, see In re Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
130. See Disney, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *152 ("Obviously, it is in the shareholders'
economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from liability for negligence, etc., to
allow directors to conclude that, as a practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith
and meet minimalist proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a
business loss.").
131. See id.at *165 (finding that a transaction is apparently immunized from inquiry if it is
putatively at "arms-length").
132. See id. at *169 ("Delaware law presumes that directors act in good faith when making
business judgments.").
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human behavior, should not work to distort the
33 legal requirements by
which human behavior is actually measured.1
The court then proceeds to apply this moral lesson to the case at
hand:
Eisner's actions in connection with Ovitz's hiring should not serve as a
model for fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow. His lapses were
many. He failed to keep the board as informed as he should have. He
stretched the outer boundaries of his authority as CEO by acting
without specific board direction or involvement. He prematurely issued
a press release that placed significant pressure on the board to accept
Ovitz and approve his compensation package in accordance with the
press release. To my mind, these actions fall far short of what
shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted with a fiduciary
position. Eisner's failure to better involve the board in the process of
Ovitz's hiring, usurping that role for himself, although not in violation
of law, does not comport with how fiduciaries of Delaware
corporations are expected to act.
Despite all of the legitimate criticisms that may be leveled at Eisner,
especially at having enthroned himself as the omnipotent and infallible
monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom, I nonetheless conclude, after
carefully considering and weighing all the evidence, that Eisner's
actions were taken in good faith. That is, Eisner's actions were taken
with the subjective belief that those actions were in the best interests of
134
the Company ....
Tellingly, an enormous amount of ink is used chastising Mr. Eisner
and the rest of the Disney board, while ultimately absolving them of any
135
liability whatsoever.
One troubling question remains: why go through all this trouble
only to let managers off the hook? Rhetorical window-dressing serves at
least three purposes: it obfuscates Delaware's influence, provides
employment for its corporate service providers, and serves as a
competitive weapon against other states. I explain each in turn.
First, opaque case law serves as a clever veneer. As Lucian
Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani observe, "the uncertainty of Delaware law
disguises the extent to which Delaware's law favors managers over

133. Id. at*4-5.
134. Id. at * 198-99.
135. See id. at *227-28.
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,,136
shareholders.
also renders
the national political influence of a state
less problematic:
with only 800,000Itcitizens

The public perception of Delaware's corporate law as technocratic and
apolitical is important for Delaware as it helps fend off federal
intervention.... Delaware has a legitimacy problem: why should a
little state make the national rules of corporate law? By constructing
law as technocratic and apolitical, Delaware defects attention from the
democratic deficit of its corporate law, legitimizes its role as
promulgator of the defacto national law, and reduces the likelihood of
a populist challenge to its preeminence.137
Second, Byzantine fiduciary standards generate litigation, thereby
creating work for a whole cottage industry of corporate service
providers. Most obviously, both plaintiff and defense counsel benefit
when there is litigation. As William Carney has argued:
There are several reasons to believe that Delaware makes litigation
more costly than elsewhere, thus imposing a higher litigation charge on
Delaware corporations for the benefit of Delaware lawyers. First,
Delaware increases litigation costs through the adoption of open legal
standards (rather than bright-line property rules) and liberal rules about
standing for derivative litigation ....

Second, attorney fees for

successful plaintiffs in derivative litigation are based on the results
obtained rather than billable hours, opening up the possibility of
premium billing for plaintiffs' lawyers.
Even race to the top theorists admit that "the Wilmington Bar
enjoys an unusually lucrative practice for a city of that size."' 139 Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller, in their interest group analysis of Delaware
law, note how "Delaware lawyers have reputedly developed local

136. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 603. Cf Gapper, supra note 21 ("It may be fair to
say we are somewhat biased in favour of management, but we cannot go off in either direction."
(quoting Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine)).
137. Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 29; see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 60304.
138. Carney, supra note 24, at 727; see also Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 61, at 1191
("Delaware might purposely be maintaining a legal regime that encourages litigation. Delaware's
corporate lawyers, an important interest group in Delaware, benefit from more, rather than less,
litigation."); Bratton & McCahery, Regulatory Competition, supra note 66, at 1888-89 ("[T]he bar's
interest diverges from the shareholders' even within the sphere of fiduciary enforcement, with the
bar favoring a system that trades substantial money judgments to shareholders for substantial
attorneys' fees."); Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware
Law (Mis)Shapes ShareholderClass Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1797, 1857-60 (2004).

139. Winter, supra note 4, at 255.
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counsel services into an art.' 140 They also emphasize the creation of a
broader network of service providers:
The existing literature, almost without exception, views the "price"
that Delaware charges for the incorporation privilege as the franchise
fees extracted from state-chartered corporations ....The relevant

literature fails to recognize that there is a second, very important,
component of the charges that Delaware imposes on corporations.
These are what might be called "indirect costs" of Delaware
incorporation-the fees paid to lawyers, accountants, investment
and
corporation
service companies as incidents of Delaware
bankers,
•
•
141
incorporation.

A final advantage, as Ehud Kamar has noted, is that "legal
indeterminacy accentuates Delaware's judicial advantage over other
states. It does so by inducing litigation, and at the same time leaving
more discretion to the courts in applying the law. 1 42 Moreover, "[w]hile
substance can be emulated by other states, an indeterminate form is more
difficult to copy and serves to accentuate the advantages that Delaware
has over its rivals. 14 3 Delaware's ability to inhere to these advantages
without stirring a public backlash is a testimony to its brilliance.
Whatever overall advantages might accrue to Delaware, the broader
message cannot be ignored: state fiduciary duties are weak. Impressivesounding obligations can be carefully skirted through clever process. As
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine candidly admits, "Delaware corporate law
generally permits corporate managers wide flexibility and errs on the
side of managerial freedom."' 144 Precious little is left of judicial review:
Over time, state courts interpreted the [fiduciary] duties in a manner
that left little substance. The business judgment rule and universal
adoption of waiver of liability provisions all but eliminated causes of
action for breach of the duty of care. The duty of loyalty, particularly
self-dealing by officers and directors, could be validated through
procedural mechanisms. With proper procedures, the fairness of the
140.
141.
142.
143.

Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 494.
Id. at 492.
Kamar, supranote 118, at 1932-33 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1946.

144. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an
Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination

in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1257, 1279 (2001); see also Cary, supra
note 3, at 670 ("[T]he judicial decisions can best be reconciled on the basis of a desire to foster
incorporation in Delaware. It is not clear, however, that the revenue thermometer should replace the
chancellor's foot."); Black, supra note 11, at 584 ("[S]ome judges, notably those in Delaware,
actively try to foster a favorable business climate.").
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transaction was not subject to judicial review. This approach
allowed
45
self-dealing by officers and directors almost without limits. 1

Whether this stance is due to the judiciary's own shrewdness, 146 or
can be ascribed to the environment in which it partakes, 47 is almost
beside the point. The bottom line is that while the common law of
fiduciary duties to corporations has immense pedagogical value in
teaching us about the art of persuasion and rhetoric, it is much ado about
very little. As William Bratton and Joseph McCahery succinctly put it:

"the genius of Delaware lawmakers lies in their ability to generate a
thick fiduciary law 1without
at the same time imposing a significant
48
compliance burden."'
Weak fiduciary duties parallel empty statutes: they create the

veneer of regulation and substantive review, respectively, but ultimately
provide an empty core upon which to base corporate governance and
protect shareholders. 149 Implicitly, both take their cues from laissez-faire
law and economics and espouse private ordering. 150 As Vice Chancellor
Leo Strine observes, "[p]ut bluntly, while the Delaware Model relies
upon governmental involvement, that involvement is limited to a
(usually deferential) inquiry into the propriety of choices made in the
first instance by the elected representatives of stockholders."' 51 Of
course, neither why nor how private ordering necessarily improves

145. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State CorporateLaw in the Governance of Public
Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 317, 318-19 (2004). As one observer points out in his critique of
agency law in the corporate context, "[f]or these modem princes, including corporate CEOs, the
term quasi-principal may be coined to capture their double lives-agents for others (their
corporations and shareholders) and de facto principals who hold vast authority and power." Eric W.
Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 265, 282
(1998).
146. See, e.g., Thompson, Challenges, supra note 24, at 783 ("[C]orporate law is made by
knowledgeable jurists who are repeat players on these issues and have an appreciation for what
works.").
147. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 585 ("[J]udges are bit players, cabined by their statutory
authority and by political and economic forces beyond their control."); Macey & Miller, supra note
5, at 502 ("The bar and the judiciary are tied together through an intricate web of personal and
professional contacts."); McDonnell, Two Cheers, supra note 66, at 134-35 ("[T]he milieu in which
the typical Delaware judge has spent his career typically has been shaped by managerial interests, as
is true for most corporate lawyers.").
148. Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium,supra note 15, at 69.
149. See supra Part H.A.
150. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1442 ("Divergence between private and
social interest is rare and does not appear to be at work in these examples.").
151. Strine, supra note 144, at 1278-79. Of course this perspective conveniently ignores the
massive collective action problems inherent in shareholder voting.
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social welfare is explained, 52 not to mention all the
problems inherent in
53
current conceptions of the shareholder franchise.1
In a monumental irony, the core of corporate law runs the risk of
becoming irrelevant to debates on corporate governance. Bernard Black
aptly observes that "appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is
trivial: it does not prevent companies-managers and investors
54
together-from establishing any set of governance rules they want.'

Irrelevance provides grist for the "race to the bottom" mill:
At the state level, triviality analysis reinforces the concerns of race-tothe bottom proponents: don't bother, because the reforms won't work.
Either the reforms will get watered down to a thin gruel in the
legislative process, or they won't get adopted. Even if they get adopted
somewhere, some enterprising state will let managers keep the
flexibility they now have.

The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project illustrates
this dismal scenario. It was launched with great fanfare in 1978, with
the goal of restating corporate law.... [Its controversial provisions]
had some bite as first proposed, but after passing through a series of
unpublished council drafts, they have been watered down to
suggestions for tinkering at the margin. This predictable outcome
reflects a vigorous lobbying
effort by the practicing bar and the
155
Business Roundtable.

One might, of course, argue that positive law is not all that relevant
51 6
since most insiders do seek to protect shareholders most of the time.'
152. See id. at 1259 ("[R]educing the indeterminacy of Delaware corporate law ...might also
impair its central emphasis on corporate empowerment and private ordering, to the detriment of
social welfare."). For a more pronounced belief in the virtues of private ordering, see Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV.
961, 970 (2001) ("The provision of entire corporate law regimes through private vendors has several
advantages over the present corporate law regime."). Unfortunately, study of welfare economics
would suggest that private ordering does not necessarily coincide with social welfare. See Dibadj,
Weasel Numbers, supra note 41.
153. See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
154. Black, supra note 11, at 544. Cf Weiss & White, supra note 45, at 602 ("But if investors
do not find judicially-wrought changes in corporate law to be significant, we believe it is unlikely
that investors consider differences between the corporate laws of different states to be much more
important.").
155. Black, supra note 11, at 580; see also Cary, supra note 3, at 699 ("Managements want
freedom from bothersome stockholders, government agencies, public opinion, and judicial review.
This is also what most of the corporate bar would prefer: flexibility and certainty. This segment of
the legal community is management-oriented; our principal clients are the companies that can afford
us.").
156. Cf Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. CorporateLaw Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1087.
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Unfortunately, however, the twentieth century reflected recurring crises
in corporate governance. 157 As a fresh batch of scandals began rocking
the corporate world in 2001,158 state law was conspicuously absent:
But where has Delaware been through all this? No bills have been
introduced in Delaware's legislature; no hearings held by its
committees; its law enforcement agents have taken no action; and its
executives have staid mum. How is it that Delaware-the home of
what has long been viewed
as the defacto national corporate law-has
159
sat on the sidelines?

The problem, of course, is not confined to Delaware.16 As Robert
Thompson notes, "the response in state corporate law has been largely
one of silence that has left any modifications in corporate governance
to... other actors"; 16 ' in the end, "no one thought that state law was the
place to address these problems."'' 62 As Part III will explore, other
players have stepped in to try to fill the gaps left by the empty core of
state corporate law.
III.
A.

LAYERING

UnderstandableBandages

Whenever scandals have shown corporate doctrine to be
inadequate, policymakers have seemingly made a curious choice. Rather
than reexamine why enabling statutes and standard fiduciary duties are
inadequate, as Part II has tried to do, lawmakers have added a series of
layers-bandages designed to stem blood from the most recent corporate
impropriety or scandal. An analogy that might be useful is that of an
157. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Hum, Delaware Courts' Delicate Response to the Corporate
Governance Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightening Judicial Scrutiny on Directors of
Corporations,41 WILLAMETrE L. REV.207, 209 (2005).
158. See id.
159. Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 1;see also Sale, supra note 16, at 456 ("In the postEnron era, there has been considerable discussion about what went wrong at Enron and elsewhere
and how to fix it....
[But the] State of Delaware, the mother of all corporate law, has been largely
absent from the debate.").
160. As Stephen Bainbridge reminds us, "the two main poster-children for reform, Enron and
WorldCom, were not Delaware corporations; they were incorporated in Oregon and Georgia,
respectively." Bainbridge, supra note 44, at 30.
161. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 102
(2003) [hereinafter Thompson, After Enron]; see also Loewenstein, Transformation,supra note 67,
at 385 ("[S]tates seem to have abdicated their traditional role of defining the internal affairs of
corporations, at least insofar as publicly-held corporations are concerned.").
162. Thompson, AfterEnron, supra note 161, at 107.
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aging and unreliable computer operating system: rather than rethink core
algorithms, a series of increasingly cumbersome patches must be
downloaded. Eventually, the latticework of patches is likely to become
so cumbersome that the end-user requires a new system, and a time of
crisis ensues.
We have already visited some of this "layering" through Part II's
discussion of state corporate law. Recall how when faced with the severe
limitations of the duty of care and duty of loyalty, Delaware courts
sometimes toy with the duties of candor or good faith, 163 or how, in the
context of controlled transactions, the courts craft heightened standards
of scrutiny, 164 only to165 be thwarted by the legislature's own new layer,
antitakeover statutes.
The bulk of the layering, however, has occurred at the federal level.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"), of course, is the most
prominent example. 166 But contrary to the conventional wisdom, 167 SOX
is not a watershed: significant federal layering has been going on for
decades. 68 As Mark Roe has shown in a series of articles, SOX is just
the latest in an array of federal incursions, which include the Securities
Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934, the Williams Act, and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 169 Roe concludes that
[i]n nearly every decade of the twentieth century, the decade's major
corporate law issue either went federal or federal authorities threatened
to take it over-from early twentieth-century merger policy, to the
1930s securities laws, to the 1950s proxy fights,
170 to the 1960s Williams
Act, to the 1970s going-private transactions.

163. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
166. For a description of SOX, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:
Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003); Lyman P.Q.
Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1149, 1154 (2004).
167. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE

DAME L. REv. 1159, 1168 (2005) ("[C]ontributions to corporate governance before the EnronSarbanes-Oxley period were minor, intermittent, and relatively ineffectual.").
168. Issues raised two decades ago seem remarkably analogous to today's problems. See, e.g.,
Marc 1. Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REV. 240, 250-58
(1984).
169. See Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 72, at 611-16; Roe, Delaware's Politics,
supra note 5, at 2520-23; see also Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium,supra note 15, at 44-57. Roe
includes the antitrust laws, but I exclude them here given that they do not implicate, at least directly,
the relationship between corporations and shareholders.
170. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics,supra note 5, at 2498.
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The layers that Roe describes have arguably benefited shareholders.
Other layers, notably the triad of securities reform statutes enacted from
1995 to 1998-the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"),
the National Securities Market Improvement Act ("NSMIA"), and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA") 17-have
been
even more pro-management than state securities laws. 172 And federal
layering has not exclusively been through statutes and regulations.
Federal courts, led by the U.S. Supreme Court, have played an important
historical role in fashioning common law remedies, most famously
through the federal common law 7 3 remedy of implied174
private rights of
action for plaintiffs alleging fraud or misrepresentation.

171. For a concise description of these laws, see Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co.,
251 F.3d 101,107-09 (2d Cir. 2001).
172. For a discussion of the differences between state corporate and state securities laws, see
David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1765, 1769
(1995).
173. The term "federal common law" is used "to refer to any rule of federal law created by a
court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional." Martha A. Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 890 (1986). As Field points out,
"the only limitation on courts' power to create federal common law is that the court must point to a
federal enactment, constitutional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common
law rule." Id. at 887. A tenable argument can be made that an enactment is not even needed. See id.
at 946; see also Louise Weinberg, FederalCommon Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 835 (1989).
174. The landmark case is Borak, where the Court implied a private right of action under SEC
Rule 14a-9 for false or misleading proxies. See J.I. Case, Co., v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964);
see also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 413 (1964) ("[S]ignificant steps toward the development of a federal common law of
corporate responsibility have already been taken by implying causes of action from and filling
interstices in laws administered by the SEC."). Beginning in the early 1970s, however, implied
rights of action have become less expansive. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (espousing a
narrower purview for federal common law based on federalism concerns); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977). For a critique of the federal common law in the context of Rule IOb-5, see
Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: the Merits of
Codifying the Private Cause of Action under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71
(1997); see also infra Part IV.B.2.
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Figure 1: The Layers of Corporate Law

EFederal
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Figure 1 presents a stylized overview of the layers that have
accumulated over the past century. Corporate law is broadly defined and
divided into three general categories: internal affairs, antifraud, and
disclosure. Additionally, a special category for transactions in control is
added to capture developments such as the Williams Act, heightened
state fiduciary duties, and state antitakeover statutes.
While readers might quibble with my placement of various
elements, at least I hope they will agree that corporate law is scattered.
At one level, this dispersion is understandable. After all, a series of
layers has been added to bandage an ailing state system. As Robert
Thompson points out, "[m]assive additions to federal statutes and
regulations, and important governance modifications by self-regulatory
organizations, such as the New York Stock Exchange's changes to its
listing requirements, have completely overshadowed any response 1of
75
state law, the traditional source of corporate law in the United States."'

175. Thompson, After Enron, supra note 161, at 100; see also Loewenstein, Transformation,
supra note 67, at 363 ("[Sltate law is nearly irrelevant in affecting the corporate governance of
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Even Delaware judges, generally hostile to SOX, 17 6 acknowledge that "it
would smack of hypocrisy for us to fail to acknowledge the substantial
integrity-generating potential of these initiatives. 177
B.

Cross-currents

So why not leave things this way? Why should federal intervention
through the securities laws not serve as a proxy for corporate
governance, as some scholars seem to suggest? 178 The problem is
straightforward: existing securities laws operate through different
mechanisms to serve different purposes.
Federal securities laws are reactive and focused on disclosure.
Congress acts "on a fire patrol basis"1 79 where "the fire alarm is a
scandal or bad economic performance."'180 Securities law, at least in part,
is public administrative law;' 81 state corporate law is "judge-made and
privately enforced.', 182 Moreover, federal securities laws are ostensibly
focused on disclosure, not governance per se. 183 While disclosure can

publicly-held corporations, with one important exception. That exception is the continuing
relevance of state law in the area of takeover defenses, the effect of which is to protect management
of poorly run firms that, perhaps, should be taken over."). Cf Black, supra note 11,at 565
("[F]ederal rules are an important source of nontrivial corporate law."); Roe, Delaware's
Competition, supra note 72, at 625 ("Today takeover law is perhaps the last important domain of
corporate law where states have nearly full authority."); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporationin American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1688 (1988).
176. See, e.g., Leo Strine, Sarbanes-Oxley 's Creeping Intrusion, FIN. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at
21.
177. William B. Chandler III& Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections from Two Residents of One Small State,
152 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 957 (2003).
178. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 863 (2003) ("[F]ederal
securities fraud litigation operates much like state fiduciary duty litigation in policing corporate
governance.").
179. Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 44.
180. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics,supra note 5, at 2530.
181. See, e.g., id.; Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SECs
Pursuitof ManagerialAccountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 486 (2001).
182. Kahan & Rock, supranote 66, at 27.
183. As Mark Loewenstein sums up:
[I]t seems that the federal government and the states reached an unwritten compromise
on corporate law. The federal government would regulate the external aspects of
corporate behavior-the interaction between the corporation and the capital marketsthrough a disclosure regime. On the other hand, the states would regulate the internal
affairs-the relationship between managers and shareholders.
Loewenstein, Transformation, supra note 67, at 357; see also Richard C. Breeden, Observations on
the Role of the SEC in Corporate Governance and Corporate Charity, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
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help lower agency costs, 184

it

is quite a leap to argue, as Mark Roe has,

that "[t]o compel disclosure of an act is to control that act." 185 Indeed, as
Robert Thompson and Hilary Sale note, disclosure can be a mixed
blessing:
Although, in general terms, disclosure is a good thing, it is not
necessarily entirely good or a good regulatory mechanism for
corporate governance claims. First, disclosure is an indirect way to
regulate managerial behavior. As discussed above, disclosure is, at
best, a monitor of what managers say, not what they do. The two may
be linked only at the margin. Second, disclosure can, as the recent
cycle reveals, create pressure for more disclosure-truthful or not.
Disclosure then is a double-edged sword. Truthful disclosures
86 work to
decrease informational asymmetries. Fraud increases them. 1
Even assuming the disclosed information is truthful, it can lead to
information overload--"the risk that investors will actually make less
accurate decisions in the face of more information as they adopt less
complicated
decision strategies in an effort to simplify their investment
'1 87
decisions."

Perhaps more importantly, federal securities regulation is often
focused on gatekeepers-outside directors, lawyers, accountants,
investment bankers, and the like-rather than squarely on corporate
insiders. While SOX does impose some duties on managers, notably the
certification of financial statements and financial controls 18 8 -it relies
primarily on gatekeeper reform by regulating the composition of audit

1179, 1182 (1997) ("Actually, most of what the SEC does as regulation is really done in the form of
disclosure.").
184. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62
U. CHi. L. REv. 1047 (1995).
185. Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 72, at 615; see also Thompson, Challenges,

supra note 24, at 789 ("[D]isclosure has emerged as a key mechanism of corporate governance, a
trait primarily associated with federal law.").
186. Thompson & Sale, supra note 178, at 909; see also Romano, supra note 4, at 226.
187. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequencesfor
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 484 (2003).

188. William Bratton and Joseph McCahery argue that even this aspect is not new:
SOX requires that the CEO and CFO certify public reports, making them responsible for
the maintenance of the firm's internal controls system, along with accompanying
criminal penalties. While these go to internal affairs, the affairs they address long have
been federalized. Moreover, the integrity of the disclosure system still stands out as the
ultimate goal. In effect, the federal government, having instituted the mandatory system,
reacts to successive compliance failures by reaching further and further back to cover the
internal processes that generate the mandated reports.
Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supranote 15, at 48-49.
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committees, accounting regulators, and the like. 8 9 For example, Jill
Fisch and Kenneth Rosen provide an insightful critique of section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (requiring lawyers to report up evidence of
corporate wrongdoing to corporate leaders) based on the near futility of
looking "to private service providers from outside of the organization to
transform corporate governance."' 90 Gatekeepers, of course, are not the
focus of state corporate law. In sum, as Robert Clark has observed, "the
SOX-related reforms were not based on a policy decision to effect a
major 'paradigm shift' in the allocation of law making authority between
the federal government and the states."' 9'
C. Status Quo as Symbiosis
If a desire to usurp state corporate law does not explain the layers,
then what can? A number of distinguished academics have suggested
that the mere threat of federal intervention serves as a check on
Delaware's power. Most prominently, Mark Roe argues that
"Delaware's freedom to act and its limits are not determined solely, and
perhaps not even primarily, by its strength vis-A-vis other states, but by
the line demarcating where the federal authorities leave it alone and
where they do not."' 92 Yet, as Roberta Romano points out, "Roe does
not identify instances of a chilling or formative effect that the federal
securities laws have had on the subsequent development of Delaware (or
other states') law, whether substantive or procedural."' 93 Indeed,
Romano's observation seems consistent with my analysis above.
189. For a description of the changes wrought by SOX, see Robert Charles Clark, Corporate
Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers
Too, GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Clark, Morality Tale], available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=808244 (classifying reforms as "audit-related changes," "board-related
changes," and "disclosure enhancements and accounting rule changes"); see also Romano, supra
note 4, at 214-16.
190. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future
Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1131 (2003). Needless to say, gatekeeper reform should not be
ignored. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 201 (2004). Nonetheless such reforms are tangential
to core corporate governance.
191. Clark, Morality Tale, supra note 189, at 30; see also Loewenstein, SEC, supra note 23, at
801 ("The near void in corporate governance standards that state law has created has not been filled
by the federal government."); Johnson & Sides, supra note 166, at 1152.
192. Roe, Delaware's Politics,supra note 5, at 2499; see also Roe, Delaware'sCompetition,
supra note 72, at 592. For similar arguments, see Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 558 ("Our
weak-competition account suggests that the greatest threat confronting Delaware is not competition
from other states but the possibility that the federal government will intervene in a way that would
undermine Delaware's position.").
193. Romano, supra note 4, at 226.
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A more Machiavellian reasoning emerges: layering, while perhaps
well-intentioned, ends up obfuscating the underlying emptiness of basic
state corporate law. Consider as a starting point that federal regulation
does not affect Delaware's franchise fees, and by simple virtue of its
national application, does not disrupt the equilibrium among states. 194 In
fact, the federal government can even help maintain the status quo in
state corporate law by serving as a buffer that deflects attention away
from what the states, most prominently Delaware, are not doing:
Delaware may favor federal intervention to the extent that it makes the
corporate law system as a whole less scandal prone and reduces the
chances of populist backlash against Delaware as principal regulator.
Thus, the relationship between federal and state regulation in corporate
law is, in our view,5 more symbiotic and less antagonistic than
generally presumed.19

William Bratton and Joseph McCahery agree that a symbiotic
relationship has emerged between Delaware and the putative federal
incursions:
The federal government is the bad cop. Its mission is to make sure that
firms tell the truth about themselves. It performs the mission with a
massive, mandatory apparatus peopled by prosecutors with political
aspirations and greedy plaintiffs lawyers, imposing fines and large
money judgments and occasionally sending miscreants to jail.
Delaware is the good cop. It arbitrates between shareholder and
management interests, making sure never to chill risk taking. It
articulates governance standards in a dialogue with the actors it
regulates. It only polices when forced. Even then it chooses its
techniques with care, sometimes enjoining a transaction but almost
never imposing a money judgment. Its mandarin case law is conversant
with financial technicalities and full of procedural nuance. 196
For our purposes, the more important point is that layers hide the
hollowness of basic corporate law. The layers-the bandages-shift
attention away from the underlying problem: the empty core. 197 Unless

194. See Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 37 ("National intervention has
impacted neither the basic terms of the state settlement nor Delaware's rent flows, once again
implying a cooperative strategy.").
195. Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 12.
196. Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium,supra note 15, at 2.
197. Cf Thompson, Challenges, supra note 24, at 800 ("When the corporate scandals of the
post-bubble economy were revealed, the major competitors to Delaware in regulating corporate
governance, i.e., Congress, the stock exchanges and the SEC, responded in a more dramatic fashion.
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systemic reform occurs, the next scandal will bring yet another reactive
bandage, thereby setting the stage for future scandals. The perennial
vicious cycle will continue.
IV.

DELAYERING

Existing strands of corporate law scholarship, while descriptively
brilliant, too often provide precious few workable suggestions for
reform. Even ignoring for a moment the implausible assumptions of
"race to the top" theorists and the unwieldy proposal of "race to the
bottom" advocates, the race debate is somewhat moot: corporate law has
reached an equilibrium and is no longer racing anywhere. For their part,
deconstruction theorists, much like the critical legal scholars of the
1970s and 80s,198 provide vague bromides that are not actionable. For
instance, we are cautioned to "understand the corporation in terms of the
capitalist political economy ... by asking whether and in what sense we
thought prices in a given market were, or could be, truthful"1 99 or to
"Improve
the
Regulatory
System.... Strengthen
Political
Democracy.... Create
a Robust Public Sphere.... Challenge
International Neoliberalism." 20 0 How all of this is to come about, let
alone what the proposals even mean, is left as an exercise for the reader.
More subtly, interdisciplinary analysis predicated on public choice or
industrial organization, for all of its valuable insight, remains too often
curiously agnostic and descriptive. 2° ! As Roberta Romano writes, the
"normative implications of the theses that no states compete and that
federal supremacy trumps state competition rationalizes the status quo, a
federal securities regime, with corporate law left to the states. 2 °2
By contrast, Part IV will try to offer suggestions for policy reform
as a starting point for debate. It draws on two emerging paradigms in
regulatory theory and applies them to corporate law: substantively,
confining regulation narrowly only to "bottleneck" elements within a
system; and procedurally, experimenting with cooperative federalism as
an alternative to either dual or preemptive federalism. I argue that
reforming corporate law requires targeting the "bottleneck":
The Business Roundtable responded more than Delaware; even the American Bar Association Task
Force responded more than Delaware.").
198. See Dibadj, CLE, supra note 39.
199. Westbrook, supra note 7, at 126-27.
200. Bakan, supranote 7, at 161-64.
201. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 3 ("For us it suffices that
the system is consensual, responsive, and monitored at the national level.").
202. Romano, supra note 4, at 229.
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reinvigorating core fiduciary duties by resetting judicial "standards of
review" to match "standards of conduct," while at the same time
focusing on the behavior of officers not just boards of directors. Finally,
the institutional approach proposed is one where the federal government
would set minimum standards, but implementation would occur through
state courts through a "reverse-Erie" principle. Minimalism is the order
of the day-policymakers must delayer corporate law to make it
meaningful.
A.

Revitalizing the Core

I begin by discussing regulatory theory, then analogize to corporate
governance. Advances in the theory of economic regulation suggest that
effective interventions cannot consist of broad "command and control"
edicts that try to micromanage an industry. Stephen Breyer's pathbreaking book, Regulation and Its Reform, suggests the metaphor of
"less restrictive alternatives" 20 3 and lays out "a framework that sees
classical regulation as a weapon of last resort and looks for less
restrictive ways to deal with problems thought to call for regulation. 20 4
The locus of attention in regulatory circles has thus moved away from
setting retail rates and controlling the entry and exit of players,2 °5 toward
improving the narrow regulation of bottlenecks where incumbents can
abuse their power. In telecommunications, for example, the bottleneck is
the last mile of cable or copper wire going into subscribers' homes; in
the electricity and natural gas industries, transmission and local
distribution facilities are the bottleneck.2 °6
How does any of this relate to delayering corporate law? The layers
of corporate law in Figure 1 above-notably the federal securities
laws-too often represent a "command and control" vision. SOX, with
all of its complexities, in many ways represents the apotheosis of this
way of thinking. By contrast, if we analogize corporate "insiders" of
corporate law to the "incumbents" in regulatory theory, new insights
emerge. One might specifically ask what "least restrictive alternatives"
are available to regulate corporations? To the extent that regulation is

203. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 341 (1982).
204. Id. at 368.
205. The paradigmatic historical examples are the transportation, energy,
telecommunications sectors. See REZA DIBADJ, RESCUING REGULATION (forthcoming).
206. See id.
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about government intervention in private contractual arrangements, 207
the question becomes even more pointed: where and how should
policymakers place mandatory rules on insiders?
State corporation statutes could be selectively redesigned to have
more bite without creating heavy-handed micromanagement of
corporations. 20 8 But such an approach is likely to meet stiff resistancethe enabling approach is simply too ingrained. A more realistic option
20 9
for statutory reform, drawing on recent work in behavioral economics,
would be to think carefully about where defaults are set. At least, as
Jeffrey Gordon suggests, "legislation that relaxes mandatory rules
should always require an affirmative shareholder decision to 'opt in' to
the change rather than merely permitting shareholders to 'opt out.' This
will prevent management from extracting more from the legislative
process than it could obtain from the charter amendment process. 21 0
While thinking carefully about defaults would be a positive step, the
bulk of real reform is unlikely to lie in elaborate statutes.
Rather, the "least restrictive alternative" lies in the "protean
concept" 2 11 of fiduciary duty. The rhetoric of contractarianism has
masked just how important these duties are. 2 12 As Jeffrey Gordon
argues, "parties taking into account the insiders' power and positional
advantage would pick a standard of fairness or good faith as measured
ex post and that this radically undermines the case for opting out of
fiduciary duties.,

21 3

It is important to emphasize

that fiduciary

obligations must be made mandatory:
More specifically, since insiders have substantial control over the
amendment process, they are continually tempted to relax fiduciary
207.

See, e.g., David P. Baron, Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions, in

HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1349 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989).

208.

For a discussion of the possible use of regulations implemented through state agencies,

see infra Part IV.B.
209. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583 (1998). Cf Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,

594 (2003) ("The somewhat surprising answer we derive from contract theory is that most statecreated defaults will be useless or inefficient.").
210. Gordon, supranote 76, at 1555. Cf Black, supra note 11, at 568-69.
211. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 90, at 861-62.
212. For a thoughtful discussion of the misleading facade of contract in the context of
corporate law, see Brudney, supra note 74, at 1410.
213. Gordon, supra note 76, at 1594. Gordon adds that "because fiduciary duty rules exist in
large measure to protect shareholders from risks against which they cannot diversify, the ex post
private wealth maximization criterion, which depends on diversification, is unsatisfactory." Id. at
1596.
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standards that govern their behavior and expose them to liability. A
mandatory rule eliminates this threat of opportunism while leaving
recourse to the legislative process to modify duties-to innovatewhere appropriate. Further, a stable conception of fiduciary duty
develops only through applying a single standard across a great range
of cases. Such a baseline represents a valuable public good, since the
verbal formulas and the standards
would vary considerably in the
2 14
absence of a mandatory rule.

Or as Ian Ayres frames it, courts can "provide a unique source for
providing non-trivial defaults." 2 15 We need to make fiduciary duties
simpler and stronger. Below, I outline a start.
1. Matching "Standards of Review" to "Standards of Conduct"
Fortunately, there is an elegant way to approach the problem. As
Melvin Eisenberg describes, "standards of review in corporate law
pervasively diverge from.., standards of conduct." 216 The BJR is
perhaps the canonical doctrinal example. As Delaware judges admit:
Where the business judgment standard applies, a director will not be
held liable for a decision--even one that is unreasonable-that results
in a loss to the corporation, so long as the decision is rational. In this
review context, the business judgment standard ("rationality")
divergesfrom, and becomes more lenient than, the normative standard
of expected conduct ("reasonableness').217
A characteristic of "standards of review" is that they focus on
procedure. As Eisenberg recounts, "a director or officer will not be liable
for a decision that resulted in a loss to the corporation, even if the
decision is unreasonable, as long as the conditions of the businessjudgment rule have been met and the decision is rational., 21 8 Sean
Griffith is thus quite correct to point out that "[t]here is a
difference... between corporate law and corporate governance, a
difference that is protected by the principle of judicial restraint
underlying the business judgment rule. 2 19

214. Id. at 1594; see also Thomas Lee Hazen, The CorporatePersona, Contract (and Market)
Failure,and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 318 (1991).
215. lan Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and
Fischel,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1415 (1992).
216. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 438 (1993).

217. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 90, at 868 (emphasis added).
218. Eisenberg, supra note 216, at 443; see also id. at 440-41.
219. Griffith, supra note 90, at 18.
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Yet it is precisely this difference that makes for weak corporate
law. The justifications for this divergence emerge as articles of faith
rather than through analysis. Delaware judges argue that the policy
underlying deferential scrutiny "reflects the concern that directors will
be too inhibited in their decision making if they risk being held liable for
decisions that involve ordinary negligence., 220 Even eminent thinkers
seem to agree with this conventional wisdom. For example, after a
thoughtful discussion of the differences between "standards of conduct"
and "standards of review," Melvin Eisenberg nonetheless posits that
"utilizing standards of review that were fully congruent with the relevant
standards of conduct would impose greater costs than the costs of letting
22 1
some persons who violated their standards of conduct escape liability,
and that "in the case of business decisions it may often be difficult for
factfinders to distinguish between bad decisions and proper decisions
that turn out badly. 22 2 Yet no evidence is offered as to why corporate
decisions should be granted such deference.
Indeed, the burden should be on those arguing for a divergence
between "standards of review" and conduct in corporate law-as
Eisenberg himself admits, "[i]n many or most areas of law, these two
kinds of standards tend to be conflated. ''223 Why should corporate law be
any different? Perhaps only because, unwittingly or not, we have made a
fetish of the corporation. The idea that judges somehow are not qualified
to judge "care" and "loyalty" is difficult to stomach: courts delve into
the most difficult and delicate areas of our lives-how we reproduce,
raise our children, and even die, to name just a few-yet somehow,
corporations are magically off limits. The laxity of fiduciary duties is
perhaps best captured in a humorous passage from Edward Rock's
account of how state corporate law is actually made: "As one
experienced Wall Street transactional lawyer put it in private
conversation, 'We're not afraid of what the Delaware courts say. We're
afraid of what the press says."'' 224 With lax fiduciary duties, savvy
practitioners have recognized that courts have effectively exited the
scene.

220. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 90, at 892. Cf In re Walt Disney, Co. 2005 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 113, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) ("But the essence of business is risk-the application of
informed belief to contingencies whose outcomes can sometimes be predicted, but never known.").
221. Eisenberg, supra note 216, at 467-68.
222. Id. at 444. Eisenberg, however, does admit that the "concept of gross negligence.., is
notoriously ambiguous." Id. at 448.
223. Id.at 437.
224. Rock, supra note 76, at 1067-68.
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In the end, the explanation for the special disjunction between
"standards of review" and "standards of conduct" does not derive from
any serious argument that such divergence leads to better law. The
current sad state of affairs is likely more about the influence of interest
groups:
[I]t is hard to see what makes corporate managers such delicate beings
that they require an exemption from the ordinary rules of the game.
The point must be that the exemption has been purchased, and
solicitude is expected within the state equilibrium. The system appears
to satisfy management, which is happy to pay attorneys to chum
litigation that rarely entails more substantial costs in terms of money
judgments or lost deals. Clearly the lawyers are also satisfied. For
shareholders, the system
225 remains problematic even in the era of
shareholder capitalism.

To get beyond the realpolitik of the status quo, I propose a simple and
intuitive reform: make "standards of review" congruent with "standards
of conduct." This would not only accord with the vast body of doctrine
outside corporate law, but would also make judicial review simpler and
more meaningful at the same time. Perhaps most surprisingly of all, an
influential group of current and former Delaware judges might perhaps
be willing to meet such a proposal at least partway:
[T]he creation of more, rather than fewer, standards of review tends to
create a false sense of doctrinal safety, encouraging boards to act in
ways that, although enabling their actions to fall into the right
categorical box, does not necessarily create
226 the result most genuinely
protective of the interest of stockholders.
Unsurprisingly, however, the new standards these judges advocate are
themselves convoluted.22 7 I propose doing away with this complexity,
225. Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 64. Cf Gevurtz, BJR, supra note 90,
at 336 ("The obstetrician dealing with a difficult labor, the trial lawyer planning strategy, or just the
automobile driver attempting a left turn into a busy thoroughfare must exercise judgment. So must
we all .... [T]here is simply no call for treating business judgments by corporate directors any
differently than any other judgment.").
226. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supranote 90, at 869.
227. The following illustrative passage should make the point:
We also would alter the current "reasonableness" standard slightly, by retaining the
existing two-step test as part of a broader, unitary inquiry into whether the board-adopted
defensive measures taken as a whole, were reasonable in light of the objective
circumstances facing the board. Under that approach, a board's failure to pass the
"threat" prong of the Unocal analysis would not automatically doom a defensive
measure to invalidation. This more flexible analytical framework would enable a board
action to pass muster under Unocal, even if the board failed to conduct a sufficient
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and finding congruence. Eisenberg, despite his legitimization of
"standards of review," does provide a wonderful summary of what
standards of conduct in corporate law should be:
Despite the welter of standards in corporate law, certain organizing
themes emerge. The standards of conduct are relatively simple. In all

areas, directors and officers must act in good faith and in the interest of
the corporation. In addition, where officers or directors are engaged in
disinterested conduct they should act reasonably, and where
they are
228
engaged in self-interested conduct they should act fairly.
Those who oppose courts from screening for these standards of conduct
will need to argue that courts should not hold corporate "insiders" to a
reasonable level of care and loyalty-the way judges generally hold
citizens in society. After the facile bromides of the Chicago School of
law and economics have worn off, it would be a difficult argument to
make with a straight face.
Another advantage of my approach is that it is easily communicable
and focuses attention of basic agency law. Specifically, it shines a light
on the fact that corporate law "has relaxed-without either explanation

orjustification-thefiduciary strictures imported from trusts and agency
so as to permit direct and indirect self-dealing and other diversionary
transactions" 229 to rely instead on "the imagery of contract and
consent.,230 This point cannot be overemphasized. As Justice Harlan
Stone reflected in the wake of excesses of the 1920s:
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which has
just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its
major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary
principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that "a man cannot serve two
masters.... Yet those who serve nominally as trustees, but relieved,
by clever legal devices, from the obligation to protect those whose
interests they purport to represent, corporate officers and directors who
award themselves huge bonuses from corporate funds without the
assent or even the knowledge of their stockholders, reorganization
committees created to serve interests of others than those whose

"threat" analysis. The primary virtue of our suggested approach is that it avoids the need
for a wholly new second-step inquiry into whether a less-than-optimally informed board
nonetheless acted "fairly."
Id. at 893-94. In addition to being difficult to follow, the judges' suggestions for reform still present
a predictable divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review. See, e.g., id. at 865.
228. Eisenberg, supranote 216, at 467 (emphasis added).
229. Brudney, supra note 74, at 1434 (emphasis added).
230. Id. (emphasis added).
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securities they control, financial institutions which, in the infinite
variety of their operations, consider only last, if at all, the interests of
far we have ignored
those whose funds they command, suggest23how
1
the necessary implications of that principle.

Justice Stone's words are at least as relevant today as they were in
1934.232 It would be difficult to argue that the perpetrators in the recent
corporate scandals were either careful or loyal.233 As Robert Thompson
and Hillary Sale summarize, "[t]oday's federal securities fraud claims
are largely efforts to recover from what could be care claims at state
law. 234 Only it is worse. The layers of Figure 1, through the artificial
sense of security they convey, make it easier to lose sight of Justice

Stone's central point: corporate insiders are agents for shareholders.
Layers might provide temporary comfort, but they will not solve the
problem.23 5
Finally, I am sympathetic to the observations of Delaware
Chancellors William Chandler and Leo Strine who point out that the

2002 corporate reforms such as SOX, "suffer from the rapidity of their
enactment and a tendency to deal with many issues somewhat
superficially and sporadically, rather than with one or two issues deeply
and coherently., 236 The most important item-one we should ponder
"deeply and coherently"-is to return to fundamental principles of
agency law and reform fiduciary duties under state corporate law.237

231. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1934).
232. On the importance of agency law to corporations, see generally Donald C. Langevoort,
Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problemsof Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1187
(2003) [hereinafter Langevoort, Candor].
233. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 25 (noting how looting at Tyco represents a
"classic self-dealing transaction by a corporate fiduciary").
234. Thompson & Sale, supra note 178, at 904.
235. In a paper analyzing the most recent federal reforms, Robert Clark has a section tellingly
entitled "The Vast Territory of Unchanged Corporate Governance." Clark, Morality Tale, supra
note 189, at 28. Clark adds that the "first [unchanged area] is substantive corporate law concerning
self-dealing, related party transactions, the setting of executive compensation, and the extraction of
private benefits from management positions and controlling relationships." Id. at 29.
236. Chandler & Strine, supra note 177, at 957.
237. Some might be tempted to argue that fiduciary duties are a bit quaint in an era
increasingly dominated by institutional shareholders. Quite the opposite is true. A pioneer in the
world of investment funds, John Bogle, warns that:
[T]he radical change from an ownership society dominated by individual investors to an
intermediation society dominated by professional money managers and corporations has
not been accompanied by the development of an ethical, regulatory and legal
environment that requires trustees and fiduciaries, as agents, to act solely and exclusively
in the interests of their principals.
John C. Bogle, IndividualStockholder, R.I.P., WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at A16.
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2. Officers, Not Just Directors
It is imperative that these revamped duties should apply squarely to
officers, not just directors. State law, particularly in Delaware, clings
stubbornly to the fiction that directors run corporations.238 As the
Chancery Court bluntly states, "[a] fundamental precept of Delaware
corporation law is that it is the board of directors, and neither
shareholders nor managers, that has ultimate responsibility for the
management of the enterprise. 2 39 Or, put simply in Robert Thompson's
words: "Director centrality is the Rule #1 in understanding Delaware
law. ' 240 Of course, anyone who has had even a passing encounter with
an actual corporation recognizes how management-centered and
hierarchical firms are. Too often, the board occupies little more than a
ceremonial position.24' To their credit, Chandler and Strine admit that
"several of the most prominent of the corporate scandals have involved
(apparently) serious breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate officers and
executives who were not directors. 24 2 Their corporate law, however, has
precious little to say on this account.
State laws do two things to exacerbate the situation: they emphasize
the board's managerial role over its monitoring role, and make a fetish
of the outside director. First, as Robert Clark has pointed out, the board's
principal function, at least according to the fiction in Delaware law, is to
manage, not to monitor.24 3 This is nonsensical. 2 "
238. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2004) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.").
239. Grimes v. Donald, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *25 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1995); see also
Chandler & Strine, supra note 177, at 1002 (exposing the trend in Delaware toward boards
composed of independent directors to the exclusion of manager-directors).
240. Thompson, Challenges,supra note 24, at 781; see also Thompson & Sale, supra note 178,
at 868.
241. See generally JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S
CORPORATE BOARDS (1989).

242. Chandler & Strine, supra note 177, at 1003.
243. See Clark, Morality Tale, supra note 189, at 22 ("[T]he classic statement of the directors'
role, in section 14 1(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, declares that the business of a
corporation is to be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors. The managerial role
is highlighted in the definitional description of the board. The monitoring role gets no such
billing.").
244. Delaware courts try to reconcile this by pointing to the board's ability to delegate. See,
e.g., Grimes, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *25-26:
Of course, given the large, complex organizations through which modem, multi-function
business corporations often operate, the law recognizes that corporate boards, comprised
as they traditionally have been of persons dedicating less than all of their attention to that
role, cannot themselves manage the operations of the firm, but may satisfy their
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Second, obsessing over the role of independent directors is prone to
make things worse. Put bluntly, independent directors may "lack the
will, time and/or the incentives,, 245 to monitor corporations. They may
also lack the expertise, or belong to a tightly knit community of likeminded directors who enjoy interlocking directorships and have a strong
interest in maintaining the hospitable ties to management that
acquiescence affords.246 In Gerald Frug's deconstruction of the stories
woven to give legitimacy to bureaucracy,247 he humorously exposes the
unrealistic expectations traditional corporate governance structures place
on what even the best-intentioned outside director might actually be able
to accomplish:
Into the chaos of the world of the expertise model, [theorists who
legitimize bureaucracy] insert a figure truly worthy of comic-book
adventure stories: Super-Expert ....In corporate law.., he could
assume a position within the bureaucracy itself by becoming a socalled "independent" or "outside" director of the company. In such a
role, he would be responsible for monitoring the activities of the
pseudo-experts-the "inside" directors and the corporate executiveseither on issues within his special area of expertise or on matters
considered particularly suspect ....To bring a truly outside
perspective to bear on corporate transactions, an outside director would
have to be fully insulated from the vision of the world that renders
inside directors' self-approval of their own activities suspect. To
possess this
kind of objectivity, Super-Expert might have to come from
24 8
Krypton.

obligations by thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and
plans and monitoring performance.
Naturally, this begs the question as to why boards are given power, but not the concomitant liability
that goes with exercising it.
245. Loewenstein, Transformation,supranote 67, at 376.
246. As an expert on organizational behavior reminds us:
Many sociological governance studies in the past ten years have concerned the impact of
interlocking boards of directors, in which individual directors serve on two or more
boards at once. The cumulative findings of this literature provide a compelling critique
of the shareholder value approach, in which directors are dutiful agents of their
shareholder principals disciplined by the operations of a market for corporate directors.
Gerald F. Davis, New Directions in CorporateGovernance, 31 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 143, 151 (2005)
(citations omitted).
247. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv.
1276 (1984).
248. Id.
at 1328-29.
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Recent corporate scandals have bome out Frug's critique.2 49 As
Mark Loewenstein sums up, the "irony is that in all of the high-profile
scandals, independent directors dominated the companies' boards. It is
therefore illogical to assume that a greater role for independent directors
would or might have avoided the identified problems. '5 0 Indeed, to the
extent that some of the layers of federal law in Figure 1 have bite, it is in
part because they focus on what officers, not just directors, are doing.25'
By analogy to the language of the regulatory theorist, officers constitute
the incumbent's "bottleneck."
My point is straightforward: if the law wants to make corporations
accountable to its shareholders, then it should focus252on the individuals
who actually manage the corporations-the officers.
3. An Emphasis on Shareholders
Some readers, who might otherwise be sympathetic to my
argument, will no doubt protest that the reforms I propose do not go far
enough. In particular, what about stakeholders other than
shareholders? 253 There is no question that corporations need to recognize
that employees, customers, communities, and the environment are a part
of the mix. 254 But at this stage in corporate law's development, focusing

doctrine on stakeholders rather than shareholders is only likely to make
matters worse. One might argue, as mainstream shareholder rights
advocates are wont, that it would be impossible to try to optimize among
constituents once non-shareholders are thrown into the mix. My
argument, however, is much more fundamental. First, shareholder
primacy does not necessarily equate to a contractarian vision for
corporate law.255 In fact, this Article has argued precisely the opposite:

249. See, e.g., Robert Frank & Elena Cherney, Paper Tigers: Lord Black's Board: A-List Cast
PlayedAcquiescent Role, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at Al.
250. Loewenstein, Transformation,supra note 67, at 375.
251. See, e.g., Thompson & Sale, supra note 178, at 905 ("[T]he federal focus on the behavior
of officers is much more in line with the reality of modem corporate America.").
252. New research even challenges the commonly held notion that boards emerged for good
economic reasons; rather, their evolution may be traced simply to the path of historical events. See
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and the Spread of the CorporateBoard of Directors, 33
STETSON L. REv. 925 (2004).
253. See, e.g., Greenfield, End of History, supra note 38, at 1421 ("[S]hareholder primacy
within corporate law. . . only works.., if the nonshareholder stakeholders have some comparative
advantage in the legislature or regulatory agencies.").
254. For example, the composition of the typical board of directors could be altered to include
these constituencies. See Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, supranote 55, at 1524-28.
255. Some commentators seem to conflate the two. See, e.g., Greenfield, End of History, supra
note 38, at 1419-21.
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the hollow core of contractarianism denigrates shareholders by
unwittingly acquiescing to corporate insiders. Second, corporate law
already allows wide management discretion-notably under the
BJR 26-and the results have been, to put it kindly, less than stellar. Too
much discretion is the problem, not the solution. Delayering and focus
go hand in hand.
My suggestions for reform thus emerge within a broader argument
that corporate law needs to emphasize shareholder rights. 25 7 As students
of corporate law know, shareholders can only do three things to protect
themselves: sell, vote, and sue. 58 Regrettably, by the time shareholders
find out it is time to sell, it is often too late.259 Voting rights, as Delaware
judges themselves admit, are notoriously ineffectual.260 Prominent
scholars, such as Lucian Bebchuk, while pointing out that such weak
voting rights do not reflect the natural order of things, 261 have already
proposed eminently reasonable electoral reforms.26 2 Within this larger
taxonomy, this Article focuses on the right to sue: providing shareholder
protection through more meaningful fiduciary duties. In other words, my
proposal dovetails with those of other commentators advocating greater
shareholder rights. Our goals are congruent and our mechanisms
complementary.

256. Cf Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing CorporateProfits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 770 (2005) ("[T]he business judgment rule makes plain that the duty of care cannot be
enforced in a way that would bar managers from exercising discretion to sacrifice corporate profits
in the public interest.").
257. Clark, Morality Tale, supra note 189, at 41 ("[S]ome of the strongest evidence of good
effects for shareholders has to do with shareholder rights, not board independence.").
258. See, e.g., Thompson, Challenges,supranote 24, at 781.
259. Consider, for example, the shareholders of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and the like, who
suffered dramatic losses in the wake of the most recent corporate scandals.
260. See Chandler & Strine, supra note 177, at 999 ("As of now, incumbent slates are able to
spend their companies' money in an almost unlimited way in order to get themselves elected. As a
practical matter, this renders the corporate election process an irrelevancy, unless a takeover
proposal is on the table and a bidder is willing to fund an insurgent slate.").
261. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing ShareholderPower, 118 _HARV. L. REV.
833, 842 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power] ("[T]he considerable weakness of
shareholders in U.S. companies is not a necessary consequence of the dispersion of ownership. This
weakness is at least in part due to the legal rules that insulate management from shareholder
intervention.").
262. See, e.g., id. at 836 ("I present the case for allowing shareholders to initiate and vote to
adopt changes in the company's basic corporate governance arrangements."); see also Bratton &
McCahery, Regulatory Competition, supra note 66, at 1926 ("We propose a federally mandated
privilege of direct shareholder access to amend the corporate charter at the annual meeting of
shareholders, with cost-shifting to be effectuated through access to the proxy statement for the
making of proposals.").
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InstitutionalApproaches

The remaining question concerns how to implement a revitalization
of corporate law's core. Once again building on new research in
regulatory theory, my goal will be to find a middle ground between
"preemptive federalism' that relies primarily or exclusively on federal
courts or administrative agencies to develop unitary and pinpointed
federal policies ...[and] 'dual federalism' that leaves the states as
autonomous actors separated from the federal government., 263 I discuss
why neither dual nor preemptive federalism will provide a lasting fix

before proposing a new version of cooperative federalism.
1. Dual Federalism
Within a dual federalist conception, two things could happen: either
Delaware, the de facto state corporate law, decides to reform itself, or

other states could react with stiffer regulation of out-of-state
corporations. Each scenario might appear tempting at first glance.
First, Delaware could move on its' own. Its lawmakers could
recognize that its laws, modeled on antiquated law and economics, 2 4 are

becoming increasingly irrelevant to corporate governance.265 More and
more commentators could realize that its statutes suffer from the
"democratic deficit" that Kahan and Rock describe, 66 and that its fuzzy
case law induces litigation with very little remedy.267 Even Delaware's
judges might be beginning to feel a little self-conscious.26 8 In short,
increasing numbers of people could realize that Delaware corporate law
is a brilliantly marketed business concerned primarily with maximizing

263. Philip J. Weiser, FederalCommon Law, CooperativeFederalism,and the Enforcement of
the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1693 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Telecom Act].
264. For a discussion of the difficulties of displacing the conventional wisdom in law and
economics, see Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido
Calabresi,64 MD. L. REv. 220 (2005).
265. See supra note 158 and accompanying text; see also Thompson & Sale, supra note 178, at
905 ("Delaware conceded much more of corporate governance than it may have anticipated when it
forwent the affirmative use of disclosure obligations or, through the exculpation clause, the
affirmative regulation of managerial care."); cf Langevoort, Candor, supra note 232, at 1226
("Federal statutes, particularly the federal securities laws and ancillary criminal laws, like
conspiracy and mail and wire fraud, are the big weapons.").
266. See supra note 135.
267. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Chandler & Strine, supra note 177, at 1001 ("It will not surprise legal scholars
that Delaware's common law was perhaps slower than ideal in adapting to the new realities, which
seem to many to cry out for a deeper and more skeptical judicial inquiry.").
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its own profits rather than providing shareholder protections. 269 As
Robert Thompson summarizes:
Is there a downside to a status quo response in Delaware? There is, if
Delaware's response would halt the intrusions from these other
sources. Two facts are relevant. First, the New York Stock Exchange is
not likely to have the same role in corporate governance that it held in
the last year. Technological changes and market shifts have dulled both
its incentives and ability to make corporate governance rules. Second,
the SEC is at the edge of its statutory authority. Congress is not likely
to revisit the question in the near term. Timely action by Delaware can
apply new pressure on the SEC and the NYSE to retreat from the
questionable authority they now seek to apply. Delaware, as it has
done before, should consider a more proactive approach that would
make Congress, the NYSE, the SEC, and the courts more comfortable
in foregoing additional regulation
and adhering to the traditional
27
0
division of corporate governance.

Even a casual glance at the business press will show the corporate
miscreant of the day being paraded in front of a courthouse in lower
Manhattan. Delaware is missing.
Assuming Delaware wishes to address its absence, it could change
a few things. Its current emphasis is on private enforcement, ex post,
through common law.27 1 As Mark Roe points out, "[n]o regulatory
agency makes forward-looking rules in Delaware" 2 72 -"[y]et the state
could adopt another lawmaking strategy: it could use a regulatory
agency with proactive, anticipatory rulemaking authority-one that
uncovered problems, that investigated firms, their managers, and their
owners, and that, like the SEC, often restricted the activities of firms,
managers, and owners prospectively. 2 73 Indeed, I have suggested a
similar mechanism in the context of antitrust. 274 But core corporate law

269. Cf Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 68 ("Delaware being a business,
only a threat to the state equilibrium matters to its bottom line."); Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at
31 (noting that the "extra-cameral activities by members of the Delaware judiciary.. . help market
Delaware law to the legal community" (emphasis added)).
270. Thompson, Challenges, supra note 24, at 801; cf Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium,
supra note 15, at 50 ("Delaware does run a risk here. Future cumulative SOX-type mandates could
so hard wire governance processes that firms decide that the choice of state of incorporation is

irrelevant and stop paying Delaware's premium price.").
271. As Kahan and Rock observe, "[t]his focus on private enforcement is distinctive both from
the international and the national perspective." Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 25.
272. Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 5, at 2501; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at

24 ("Delaware has no regulatory agency that enforces its corporate law.").
273. Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 5, at 2527.
274. See Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, supra note 39.
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is different.275 Much like torts or contracts, it requires a broader
balancing of social impact rather than becoming immersed in technical
details as in competition policy. 276 Moreover, it would stretch the

imagination to believe that Delaware would have the political will to
establish and support such an agency.27 7 A less drastic step, but
nonetheless one that would acknowledge corporate law as a form of
public law, would be for Delaware to enforce its corporate laws using a
prosecutor. Currently, Delaware "does not enforce corporate norms
through criminal proceedings; and even though the Attorney General has
some civil enforcement powers with respect8 to for-profit corporations,
27
these powers are virtually never exercised.,
Interestingly, the prosecutorial route is one mechanism that
Attorneys General in some other states-most notably Eliot Spitzer in
New York-have followed as a proxy to enforcing corporate law. 2 7 ' But
would states be willing to go further? This question depends in large part
on what conception one has of the internal affairs doctrine-the
"continued applicability of the internal affairs rule is, of course, the life280
blood of Delaware."
At first glance, the doctrine seems to impose a barrier to the
regulation of out-of-state corporations. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
described:
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a
corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors,

275. Mark Roe analogizes Delaware to a federal administrative agency. See Roe, Delaware's
Politics, supra note 5, at 2542 ("Instead of seeing Delaware as solely the upshot of a market of
competing states, we also see it as like a federal agency-captured by its interest groups-that can
only move as far as Congress allows.").
276. See Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, supra note 39, at 788-89.
277. Cf. Loewenstein, Transformation, supra note 67, at 376 ("If not independent directors,
one might ask, who? The only other candidates are governmental regulators, a solution no one
embraces because of the fear that government has neither the resources nor the expertise to monitor
corporate governance.").
278. Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 24; see also Roe, Delaware'sPolitics, supra note 5, at
2501 ("No Delaware prosecutor scrutinizes corporate America to throw wrongdoers in jail .... ").
279. See, e.g., Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 5, at 2528 ("Corporate and financial
prosecutions emerge in big states, like New York (think of N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's
recent prosecutions) ... not in Delaware.").
280. Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 33.
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and shareholders-because
otherwise a corporation could be faced
28
with conflicting demands. 1

Upon deeper scrutiny, however, the internal affairs doctrine reveals itself
not to present an insurmountable block. To begin with, it is not a
by the
constitutional imperative. 282 Moreover, the guidance provided
2 83
Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides space to regulate:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to
determine... [issues involving the rights and liabilities of a
corporation] except in the unusual case where, with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to
parties, in which event the local law of the other
the occurrence and the
284
state will be applied.

Comment g seems to allow even more leeway, observing that
"[s]tatutes in a number of states forbid regulation of the internal affairs
of foreign corporations.... On the other hand, statutes in other states
specifically provide for such regulation."285 As Bernard Black notes,
"[a]t the state level, the best prospect for manager constraining rules is
laws whose force depends on contacts with the state other than
incorporation., 286 David Skeel observes that "[i]f choice of law were
based not on the state of incorporation, but on some other factor such as
281. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). Richard Buxbaum's historical analysis
suggests that:
The internal affairs doctrine-that the internal affairs of a corporation normally should
be governed by the law of the state of incorporation-began as a forum derogation
concept. Early courts, called on to provide relief to some shareholders (or creditors) of a
foreign corporation, understandably were unsure whether their jurisdictional reach was
broad enough to guarantee that they could grant complete rather than partial or, worse,
inconsistent relief.
Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalizationof the Internal Affairs Doctrine in
CorporationLaw, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 43-44 (1987).
282. See, e.g., Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Marketfor Corporate Control. State
Takeover Statutes after CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 764-65 (1988) ("Although the
[United States Supreme] Court historically has deferred to the law of the state of incorporation on
issues involving internal affairs, that does not mean that the Court has established a constitutional
requirement under the commerce clause mandating that the law of the state of incorporation be
applied on all corporate governance issues.").
283. Of course, states could choose not to abide by the Restatement and return to more basic
conflict of laws principles.
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF LAW, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971).
285. ld., Comment g (Reporter's Note) (emphasis added). The major states that already attempt
to regulate out-of-state corporations are New York and California. For a negative view of these
attempts, see Carney, supra note 24, at 759 ("Statutes that preclude vigorous competition, such as
those of New York and California that reduce the benefits of migration by regulating pseudoforeign corporations, are the real problem.").
286. Black, supra note 11, at 580. Cf Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 33.
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the firm's principal place of business, corporate managers would lose
much of their incentive to shop for the optimal corporation
law regime,
287
and the competition for charters would break down.,
Notwithstanding these arguments, states themselves are unlikely to
bolster regulation. Delaware is unlikely to budge: it has too much
invested in its existing legal infrastructure, fuzzy case law and all. And it
is too busy enjoying rents derived from the current equilibrium. The
recent Disney case 288 only confirms this pessimism. For their part, other
states-New York's Eliot Spitzer notwithstanding-generally lack
incentives to move in a systemic fashion.289 It is thus no coincidence, as
Part II has described, that state corporate laws have descended into an
equilibrium that protects the interests of managers to the detriment of
shareholders.2 90 Dual federalism has gotten us into this mess and is
unlikely to get us out.
2. Preemptive Federalism
Preemptive federalism is happening to some extent-visually, it is
depicted in the dark grey layers in Figure 1 above. Given state corporate
law's empty core, it is natural to want the federal government to step in
to protect shareholders.2 9 ' As one might expect, federal preemption is
the solution of "race to the bottom" theorists. 292 Additionally, there is
virtually no question, given the Commerce and Supremacy clauses, that
the federal government has constitutional authority to override the state
law of corporations.293 The more interesting question, however, is

287. Skeel, supra note 62, at 521.
288. See supra notes 126-33.
289. As Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar observe, "[o]ther than Delaware, states do not gain
significant financial benefits from competing. Even if they attracted a substantial number of public
corporations, they would neither earn meaningful additional franchise taxes under their current tax
structures nor profit significantly from an increase in legal business." Kahan & Kamar, supra note
6, at 748. In addition, "state lawmakers pursue political goals rather than economic profits." Id.
290. Cf Black, supra note 11, at 586 ("The chartermongering race, whether to the top, the
bottom, or somewhere in between, is essentially over. All that's left is incremental change to
respond to changing circumstances .... [T]he difference between most state laws are small.").
291. See supra Part III; see also Steinberg, supra note 168, at 257 ("The expansive
construction given by many courts to the business judgment rule, in conjunction with state antitakeover statutes that protect incumbent management, strongly suggest that any meaningful
shareholder protection and reforms in the tender offer area must come from existing federal law and
the implementation of further Congressional and SEC action.").
292. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 3. Cf Bainbridge, supra note 44, at 30 ("The basic case for
federalizing corporate law rests on the so-called 'race to the bottom' hypothesis.").
293. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 44, at 26 ("No one seriously doubts that Congress has the
power under the Commerce Clause, especially as it is interpreted these days, to create a federal law
of corporations if it chooses."); Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 7.
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whether preemptive federalism is even good policy, and if so,
294 whether it
can be implemented more simply than via contorted layers?
Two new mechanisms would be available to the federal
government: chartering and federal standards.2 95 Federal chartering
297
would be simplest, 296 and unlike simply preempting certain state laws,
would disrupt Delaware's rent flows from franchise fees. 298 For their
part, new federal standards could take two different forms. The first
would revolve around the SEC by extending securities laws---either to
provide greater regulation of specific areas such as takeovers,2 99 or more
broadly to expand the federal common law centered around proxy
regulation and securities fraud. A second option, not as dependent on the
SEC, would be to create new federal fiduciary standards and enforce
them in federal courts. 300 For example, Lucian Bebchuk suggests the
need for direct federal intervention
with respect to issues that are significantly redistributive, including
self-dealing, taking of corporate opportunities, and insider
trading... [] issues that directly implicate the strength of market
discipline, including the regulation of corporate takeover and proxy
contexts ... [and] issues that involve potential transfers between
294. Cf Thompson & Sale, supra note 178, at 909 ("The remaining question for further
discussion, then, is whether the disclosure approach is sufficiently efficacious, and if not, whether
we should recognize the strong role of federal law in monitoring corporate governance and
reformulate it to do so in a more direct fashion.").
295. Some commentators suggest other tentative possibilities. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz,
Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 189-205 (2003) (arguing that federal
law could impose caps on the number of firms per state, subsidize firms or states to innovate in
corporate law, and even provide intellectual property protection for innovations in corporate law).
296. Of course, there are variations, such as offering federal incorporation as an option. See,
e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 613.
297. See, e.g., Roe, Delaware'sPolitics, supra note 5, at 2518 ("[l]f Congress federalizes a
law, Delaware need not lose tax revenues.").
298. Cf Griffith, supra note 90, at 66 ("As long as Delaware's franchise fees are safe, state
legislators are less likely to be sensitive to the incremental federalization of corporate law.");
Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium,supra note 15, at 65 ("And, despite its entry into internal affairs,
SOX in no way impairs the charter market or Delaware's rent flows.").
299. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REv. 111, 115-16 (2001) ("[A] mandatory federal process rule
would enable shareholders to decide to have their corporation opt into the optional federal takeover
regime even against the wishes of the corporation's managers.").
300. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 3, at 701 (advocating "minimum corporation law provisions
which shall be applicable to companies doing business in interstate commerce and construed by
federal judicial standards. Uniformity is of the essence."); Bebchuk, Federalism,supra note 27, at
1484 ("[Wle should consider expanding federal law to govern-or at least set minimum standards
for-managers' fiduciary duties, the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders in freezeouts and
allocation of opportunities, and the various aspects of takeover bids and proxy contests now
governed by state law."); Brown, supra note 145, at 376-78.
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public shareholders and a dominant shareholder, including goingprivate freezeouts, parent-subsidiary mergers, and the 3allocation
of
1
opportunities between parent companies and subsidiaries. 0

While such proposals are well-intentioned and elegant, they face
institutional roadblocks, since neither the SEC, nor the federal courts,
nor even Congress has the capacity to manage corporate governance.
To begin with, implementation would be difficult without specific
Congressional authorization. The SEC is at the limits of the powers
delegated to it. 302 Controversies related to Rule 14a-8 "precatory"
shareholder town hall meeting proposals, 30 3 and Rule 19c-4 "one share,
one vote" rights 30 4 reflect the precariousness of its mandate in the realm
of corporate governance. The regulatory tap-dance is perhaps most
contorted when the SEC is relegated to exerting its influence indirectly
by having the stock exchanges implement what the Commission would
be precluded from doing directly. 30 5 As a former Chairman of the agency
somberly warns, "the SEC tiptoes in the corporate governance area, with

301. Bebchuk, Federalism, supra note 27, at 1484. In addition, Bebchuk notes that "state
competition may well produce socially undesirable results whenever a corporate law issue involves
significant externalities ... [such as] the regulation of takeovers and proxy contests, the protection
of creditors, disclosure regulation, and the protection of constituencies other than providers of
capital." Id. at 1494.
302. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1993) ("The statutory language and legislative history are ambiguous as
to whether the SEC is authorized to enact rules with a substantive effect on corporate governance or
simply to implement disclosure requirements.").
303. See, e.g., Bebchuk, ShareholderPower, supra note 261, at 846 ("[U]nder state corporate
law, directors have discretion whether to follow precatory proposals that receive substantial or
majority support, and directors' freedom to disregard such resolutions is protected under the
business judgment rule."); Thompson, Challenges, supra note 24, at 798; Fleischer, supra note 3, at
1159.
304. The landmark case is Business Roundtable v. SEC, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held that "[b]ecause the rule directly controls the substantive allocation of powers
among classes of shareholders, we find it in excess of the Commission's authority under § 19 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The court added that "[i]f Rule 19c-4 were validated on such broad grounds, the Commission would
be able to establish a federal corporate law by using access to national capital markets as its
enforcement mechanism." Id. at 412.
305. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of CorporateGovernance Listing Requirements,
54 SMU L. REV. 325, 338-39 (2001) ("[S]tock exchange listing standards operate as a bridge
between state and federal law with respect to corporate governance, but their legal status is
uncertain."); Thompson, Challenges, supra note 24, at 793 ("The current set of regulations differs
from the historic NYSE listing standard and has much more of the appearance of an indirect way for
the SEC to operate in a manner that a federal appellate court in the Business Roundtable case said
the federal agency could not."). Cf Bainbridge, supra note 44, at 28 (criticizing "the troubling
expansion of stock exchange listing standards that displace state corporate law").
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an omnipresent shadow of doubt
surrounding the question of the breadth
30 6
of the SEC's own mandate."
More broadly, the federal government-beginning as early as the
late 1970s-has been increasingly solicitous of federalism issues in
corporate governance. Examples include gradual acceptance of state
antitakeover statutes under a less rigorous dormant commerce clause
analysis, 30 7 and a careful carve-out for derivative actions based on state
fiduciary duty claims in SLUSA. 30 8 This direction is consistent with a
general movement, at least since Cort,30 9 to cabin federal common law
as it relates to corporate governance. As the Supreme Court cautioned in
the landmark case of Santa Fe Industries v. Green,3 10 "[a]bsent a clear
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where 3established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden." 11
306. Breeden, supra note 183, at 1182.
307. Compare Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) (appellant "argues that Illinois
seeks to protect resident security holders and that the Act merely regulates the internal affairs of
companies incorporated under Illinois law. We agree with the Court of Appeals that these asserted
interests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois imposes on interstate commerce.") with
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987) ("The longstanding prevalence of
state regulation in this area suggests that, if Congress had intended to pre-empt all states laws that
delay the acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly.").
Of course, there were differences in the structure of the Illinois and Indiana statutes, but it is
important to note that Justice White, who authored the MITE opinion, dissented in CTS. For more
discussion of these statutes, see, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The Role of States in Tender Offers: An
Analysis of CTS, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 1 (1988); Pinto, supra note 282.
308. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 10 (noting that SLUSA "which in effect
deprived state courts ofjurisdiction over securities class actions for misrepresentations or deceit and
eliminated the states' ability to apply their own securities laws on misrepresentations or deceit in
class actions, contains the so-called 'Delaware carve-out' which specifically exempts actions for
misrepresentations based on the corporation law of a company's state of incorporation from its
provisions"); Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 55 ("But before passage, a
Delaware-oriented carve-out was added in the Senate, assuring that state litigation in respect of
fiduciary duty would be unaffected."); Jennifer O'Hare, DirectorCommunications and the Uneasy
Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the
FederalSecurities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 475, 476 (2002).
309. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
310. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
311. Id. at 479; cf Cort, 422 U.S. at 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal
law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law
will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."); Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 779 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("[W]e hold that director misconduct of the type traditionally regulated by state corporate
law need not be disclosed in proxy solicitations for director elections. This type of mismanagement,
unadorned by self-dealing, is simply not material or otherwise within the ambit of the federal
securities laws."). The retrenchment of federal common law has continued and is not limited to the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

55

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:469

Of course, Congress could act directly and boldly, as some
prominent commentators have suggested.3t 2 While this would avoid the
prudential considerations discussed above, it brings with it its own host
of problems. As one scholar observes, "[c]orporate law would be just
one issue out of a huge agenda for the U.S. Congress, whereas
Delaware's very success in the state competition makes corporate law a
much more central concern to Delaware politicians. The same also holds
true for Delaware judges versus federal judges. 313 Assuming, arguendo,
that Congress would be able to act on an ongoing basis, it is unclear
whether its drafting of statutes would necessarily be to shareholders'
benefit. Any federal statute that seeks to be comprehensive will likely
descend into complexity in order to satisfy various interest groups.3 14 As
Mark Roe posits, "if Congress made most corporate law directly,
America's corporate law would look more like the tax code than current
corporate law." 31 5 In addition to the complexity issue, preemptive
federalism would either help shareholders, or further entrench managers,
depending on the political vagaries of the day. The Williams Act
arguably benefited incumbent management, and the PSLRA, NSMIA,
SLUSA are all examples of federal laws effectively meant to preempt
more generous state securities laws.3 16 Not to mention that federal
oversight of corporate accounting-the root of many of the recent
corporate scandals-has been lax. 317 Perhaps most amusingly, it is
important to remember that while corporate interest groups do clamor
for "states' rights" when federal laws do not suit them, they are also not
ashamed to turn around and argue for federal preemption in the face of
corporate arena. See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994); Kamen v. Kemper
Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90 (1991). As one commentator has observed, the Supreme Court "altered
dramatically the balance between state and federal power during the 1990s: by restricting the federal
common law making powers of the federal courts." Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common
Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 899 (1996).
312. See, e.g., Seligman, Minimum CorporateStandards,supra note 74, at 972-73.
313. McDonnell, Two Cheers, supra note 66, at 124. Cf Skeel, supra note 62, at 515; Romano,
supra note 4, at 229.
314. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 743-44 ("Like noncompeting states, Congress
would likely be amenable to lobbying by campaign contributors. As a result, it would likely play to
corporate managers, subject to occasional corrective legislation following financial debacles.").
315. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics,supra note 5, at 2515.
316. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 15, at 51. Cf Marc I. Steinberg,
The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 395
(1993).
317. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 744 ("[M]embers of Congress opposed by an
overwhelming margin a proposal by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to require
companies to account for stock options as an expense-until, that is, a series of major financial
scandals changes the political calculus somewhat.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss2/6

56

Dibadj: Delayering Corporate Law
20051

DELA YERING CORPORA TE LA W

inconvenient state laws.3t 8 Smart Delaware judges have been quick to
pounce on this inconsistency.3 19
Given the limitations on Congress as a decision-making body and
on the federal courts as enforcers of corporate law, perhaps the most
workable approach under a preemptive federalist model would be for
Congress to draft some broad mandates, and then delegate expanded
responsibilities to the SEC as its expert agency. This is possible and
certainly more feasible than Congress trying to do things directly, but it
would vastly expand the Commission's duties and require a rethinking
of how the agency operates. After all, at least prior to the most recent
spate of corporate scandals, the SEC was not always a paragon of
performance. 320 As one article in the Wall Street Journal asks, "[h]ow
did the SEC's staff of more than 3,000 allow Mr. 32Spitzer's
investor1
torch?,
enforcement
the
grab
to
84
of
staff
protection
In sum, Congress, the federal courts, and the SEC-even in careful
combination and with the best of intentions322 -could not manage
corporate governance by themselves. A new approach would be vastly
preferable.
3. Cooperative Federalism
Ideally, we would like the best of both worlds: some kind of federal
intervention to force the states out of their equilibrium, while at the same
time not requiring the vast federal machinery--Congress, SEC, and the
courts-to supervise corporate governance on an ongoing basis. The

318. The pattern, of course, extends beyond corporate law. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman,
Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 429, 447
(1996); Jonathan Peterson, Lenders Target State Laws: An Industry that Makes Home Loans to
People With Poor Credit Wants Uniform Federal Rules that Could Undo Tougher Consumer
Protections,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at A1; David Rogers, Missouri Lawmaker Lends Movers a
Hand, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2005, at A4.
319. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 144, at 1273 ("In 1998, corporate America persuaded
Congress to restrict the ability of shareholder plaintiffs to bring disclosure class actions in the
federal courts and to preempt most state regulation of corporate disclosures in such lawsuits.").
320. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 66, at 35 (noting how Eliot Spitzer was "visibly on
the ball while the Securities and Exchange Commission was asleep"); Alan R. Palmiter, The
ShareholderProposalRule: A FailedExperiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REv. 879, 883
(1994) (lamenting "the SEC's erratic and desultory performance" in the context of Rule 14a-8).
321. Mark Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Behind SEC's Failings: Caution, Tight Budget,
'90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at At; see also Jesse Eisinger, SEC Screwdriver
JoinsSpitzer Hammer as Hedge-Trimmer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2004, at Cl.
322. Cf.Robert B. Thompson, Protecting ShareholderRights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 222 (1999) ("Congress has repeatedly refused to enact a federal
incorporations act, and federal courts often have restricted the reach of federal securities laws, citing
a desire to preserve federalism and traditional state regulation of corporate matters.").
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notion of cooperative federalism, again drawn from regulatory theory,
provides at least a promising beginning to addressing the conundrum.
Philip Weiser, a leading commentator on cooperative federalism in
the regulatory arena, provides a compelling description of the idea:
In contrast to dual federalism, cooperative federalism envisions a
sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government and the
states that allows states to regulate within a framework delineated by
federal law .... Significantly, these programs neither leave state
authority unconstrained within its domain, as would a dual federalism
program, nor displace such authority entirely with a unitary federal
program, as would a preemptive federalism.... By crafting a middle
ground solution between the extremes of dual federalism and
preemptive federalism, Congress continues to outstrip existing
constitutional
rhetoric, which envisions a separation that does not exist
323
in practice.
While cooperative federalism has yet to be discussed in the context of
corporations, the reasons behind its emergence in the regulatory arena
offer a striking parallel to the current problems in corporate law:
Under the cooperative federalism model, certain choices are removed
from the state level to ensure that the state does not compromise-for
whatever reason-on issues of national importance. Thus cooperative
federalism schemes define the terms of competition between the states
so that they do not deviate from basic federal policy goals, underinvest
in goods and services that324would benefit neighboring states, or engage
in a "race to the bottom."
Cooperative federalism has been used in a variety of regulatory
contexts: environmental law, telecommunications, and social services, to

323. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecturefor Cooperative Federalism, 79
N.C. L. REV. 663, 664-65 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, ConstitutionalArchitecture]; see also Harold
J. Krent, CongressionalDelegations ofAdministrative Authority Outside the FederalGovernment,
85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 67 (1990) ("The most familiar consist of congressional delegations of
authority to states and state officials to implement and help enforce federal regulatory schemes.").
324. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism,and TelecommunicationsReform, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Weiser, Chevron]. As Weiser
elaborates:
there are at least three related reasons why the federal government has decided to
promote diversity in federal regulatory regimes: (1) to allow states to tailor federal
regulatory programs to local conditions; (2) to promote competition within a federal
regulatory framework; and (3) to permit experimentation with different approaches that
may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strategy.
Weiser, Telecom Act, supra note 263, at 1698. All of these reasons are eminently applicable to
corporate law.
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name a few. 3 25 In their usual incarnation, cooperative federalism
programs "set forth some uniform federal standards-as embodied in the
statute, federal agency regulations, or both-but leave state agencies
with discretion to implement the federal law, supplement it with more
stringent standards, and, in some cases, receive an exemption from
federal requirements. 32 6 This framework can potentially bring
challenging constitutional issues to the fore. In AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board,32 7 which interpreted the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Justice
Scalia went out of his way to mention that the Court's opinion assumes
the following:
[A] scheme in which Congress has broadly extended its law into the
field of intrastate telecommunications, but in a few specified areas
(ratemaking, interconnection agreements, etc.) has left the policy
implications of that extension to be determined by state commissions,
which-within the broad range of lawful policymaking left open to
administrative agencies-are beyond federal control. Such a scheme is
decidedly novel, and the attendant legal questions, such as whether
federal courts must
defer to state agency interpretationsoffederal law,
328
are novel as well.

While federal deferrals to state agencies have been found
constitutional,329 the important question that Justice Scalia puts forth
seems to revolve around whether Chevron deference should be granted
to state agencies; or, put differently, whether state agencies should be
permitted to create federal common law.33 °
The institutional approach I advance for corporate law, however,
carefully avoids this issue. I propose that Congress craft a short statute
that does two things: (i) as a baseline, requires that "standards of review"
match "standards of conduct" for both directors and officers-thereby
325.

See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from

Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalismfor Recovery under the EndangeredSpecies Act,

27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45 (2002); Weiser, Chevron, supra note 324; Sheryll D. Cashin,
Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State
Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999). See generally Weiser, Constitutional Architecture,
supranote 323, at 664-65.
326. Weiser, Telecom Act, supra note 263, at 1696.
327. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
328. Id.at 385 n.10 (emphasis added).
329. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
330. For differing viewpoints, compare Weiser, ConstitutionalArchitecture, supra note 323, at
719 ("[O]ur constitutional commitment to federalism and effective governance justifies state agency
administration of federal law not subject to federal agency review.") with Reza Dibadj, Competitive
Debacle In Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecommunications Act to Blame?, 81 WASHi. U. L.Q. 1,
58-59 (2003).
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enhancing the duties of care and loyalty; and (ii) replaces state court
standards for dismissal with federal standards less favorable to
defendants.33 1 Implementation, however, would be left to state courts,
not federal courts or state agencies.
The constitutional underpinnings of the approach rely on the
"reverse-Erie" principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Testa
v. Katt332 -simply put, state courts have an obligation to enforce federal
law.333 More specifically, Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly
confirmed Congress's right to create a federal claim to be litigated
exclusively in state courts.334 Even Justice O'Connor's opinion in New
York v. United States,335 which held, under an anti-commandeering
principle, that "the Constitution simply does not give Congress the
authority to require the States to regulate, 3 36 nonetheless was very
careful to observe that "[f]ederal statutes enforceable in state courts do,
in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal
'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy
Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to
command state legislatures to legislate. 3 37 One federal judge puts it

331. Cf Joel Seligman, The New CorporateLaw, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 61-62 (1993) ("The
federal fiduciary duty cause of action Congress could enact would be litigated in federal court and
would expressly prohibit federal courts from deferring to special litigation committees in suits
properly alleging the misconduct of any member of the board of directors."); Seligman, Minimum
Corporate Standards, supra note 74, at 973 ("The new federal rule would be procedural. It would
substitute for the special litigation committee the well-established federal courts' standard for
dismissals of nonmeritorious suits."). By contrast, my approach centers around state, not federal,
courts.
332. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
333. See id.at 389 ("For we cannot accept the basic premise on which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that it has no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the United States
than it has to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign country."); see also Friendly, supra
note 174, at 407 ("Just as federal courts now conform to state decisions on issues properly for the
states, state courts must conform to federal decisions in areas where Congress, acting within powers
granted to it, has manifested, be it ever so slightly, an intention to that end.").
334. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900) ("[T]he mere fact that a suit
is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the Federal Courts."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 385
(1996) ("[E]ven when exclusively federal claims are at stake, there is no 'universal right to litigate a
federal claim in a federal district court."' (citation omitted)); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 (2002).
335. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
336. Id.at 178.
337. Id. at 178-79 (emphasis added).
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succinctly: "[n]o
creating a federal
Beyond its
precedent in the

DELA YERING CORPORATE LAW

constitutional impediment prevents Congress338from
right that can only be vindicated in state courts."
overarching constitutionality, there is also specific
regulatory context for my approach. The Telephone

Consumer Protection Act of 199 1,339 which authorizes a plaintiff to file

suit "if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State ... in
an appropriate court of that State," 340 provides a useful analogy. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in upholding the
statute, "[w]e today reach the somewhat unusual conclusion that state
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a cause of action created by
federal law.",34 1 The court remarked that "[b]ecause federal-question
jurisdiction ultimately depends on an act of Congress, the scope of the
district courts' jurisdiction depends on that congressional intent
manifested in the statute. 342
My approach thus differs from that of scholars who typically
suggest creating a right in federal court to litigate based on state
fiduciary standards.343 I suggest precisely the opposite: creating a right to
litigate in state court based on federal fiduciary standards.
Such a construct presents a number of advantages. First, it
maintains the existing infrastructure of state courts as a forum to resolve
corporate law disputes. By tweaking substantive standards, the existing
judicial machinery-notably Delaware's---could now be used to benefit
shareholders, not just to generate litigation. 344 A side-benefit is that it
relieves the already overburdened federal courts from the frontlines of

338. William G. Bassler, The Federalizationof Domestic Violence: An Exercise in Cooperative
Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1139, 1186
(1996); see also Ackerman, supra note 318, at 446.
339. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991).
340. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2004).
341. Int'l Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Commc'ns, 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir. 1997). The
Second, Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have agreed with the Fourth Circuit. See Chair King, Inc.
v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997); Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156
F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 (11 th Cir. 1998);
Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., 156 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1998).
342. Inacom, 106F.3d l146at 1153-54.
343. A leading advocate of such an approach is Joel Seligman. See, e.g., Seligman, Minimum
CorporateStandards, supranote 74, at 973 ("Congress should enact a federal cause of action based
on existing state corporate law fiduciary standards.... This cause of action would be litigated in
federal court.... The fiduciary standards applied by federal courts would remain state corporate
law.").
344. As just one example, if "standards of review" are upped to "standards of conduct" then
Delaware could not fashion an opinion as in Disney, see supra notes 126-33.
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policing corporations.34 5 Indeed, one of the problems emanating from
SOX is the burden on the federal government and the accompanying
ambiguity as to the role of the states in the implementation.3 46
Second, it does not lock in the states to a national corporate law
regime, but only sets a minimum federal floor for fiduciary obligations.
As this upsets the existing equilibrium, those states that might be serious
about offering greater shareholder protections would be free to do so,
provided they not be allowed to contract out of the federal statute.3 47 A
related benefit is that allowing an interpretative role for state courts
348
allows state doctrine to evolve, thereby avoiding the "vestigialization'
of state law that accompanies preemptive federalism, as has happened in
bankruptcy 349 and securities regulation. 350 It goes without saying that a
belief in devolving some power to the states does not necessarily equate
to conservative laissez-faire economics."'
345. Interestingly, it appears to be for this reason that William Cary reluctantly seems to
acknowledge that there might be a role for state courts as a fallback option. See Cary, supra note 3,
at704-05. Of course, I propose cooperative federalism because it is good policy; alleviation of the
burden on federal courts is only an incidental benefit. Cf Barry Friedman, Under the Law of
Federal Jurisdiction:Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1211, 1222-23 (2004).
346. As William Chandler and Leo Strine point out:
Because the [2002 federal] Reforms address boardroom practices traditionally governed
by state law but do not, in themselves, constitute a comprehensive body of substantive
corporation law, the Reforms will inevitably begin to influence state law adjudication.
One of the important factors supporting this intuition is that Congress and the Exchanges
did not supply forums for the resolution of implementation disputes at the instance of
stockholders.
Chandler & Strine, supranote 177, at 982. Cf Johnson & Sides, supra note 166, at 1225.
347. Cf Carney, supra note 24, at 717 ("Though the constraint of competition is not perfect, it
probably curbs management rent-seeking more effectively than an alternative such as federalizing
corporate law, and certainly produces greater innovation."); McDonnell, Two Cheers,supra note 66,
at 139 ("Full-fledged nationalization would lose the gains from diversity and experimentation. Fullfledged devolution to the states would eliminate the check on excessive managerialism that the
various federal actors provide."); Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top:
State Competitionfor Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
681, 708 (2003) ("[C]ompetition among states for corporate charters may be one way of slowing
down the process of locking into a particular corporate law regime.").
348. Skeel, supra note 62, at 474.
349. See id. at 474-75 n.7 ("[A]fter the separation of state corporate law and federal corporate
bankruptcy, the interaction between these two areas of law is based upon the remnants of what
might otherwise have been a cohesive, integrated policy.").
350. See supra note 110; Langevoort, Candor, supra note 232, at 1208 ("The question of why
an intra-corporate duty of candor has not evolved as a legal doctrine has another answer: the federal
securities laws have made it less necessary because it has created a strong enough obligation of
candor to the marketplace.").
351. The mantra among traditional law and economics commentators is to argue for less
government, not necessarily for states' rights if it does not suit their agenda. See, e.g., A.C.
Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and The Securities Litigation Uniform
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Third, and perhaps most excitingly, thinking about cooperative
federalism as it relates to corporate governance can offer a fresh
perspective on the intersection of federalism and corporate law. The
underlying, perhaps counterintuitive, premise is that state courts would
be articulating federal common law. 352 One issue would be how the
federal statute should manage appeals-the United States Supreme
Court would have the final say,353 but to what extent should a state
court's decision be reviewable by a federal appellate court? Will
resistance develop to state court articulation of federal common law?
Might more complex forms of "multijurisdictional" adjudication
emerge? 354 To what extent might congressional delegations to state
actors be in tension with Article II's mandate that the executive should
"execute" federal laws? 355 Could mandating state courts to follow
of suits in turn be subject to an antifederal procedures for dismissal
356
commandeering argument?
Future research might include these questions, and no doubt many
more. As the Supreme Court observed in New York, "the task of
ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and state power has

StandardsAct of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 439-40 (2000) ("1 conclude that the Uniform Act is
consistent with principles of constitutional federalism because its preemption results in less, rather
than more, government interference with private conduct ....[T]he Uniform Act enhances
individual liberty because eliminating state regulation enhances individuals' choices.").
352. See, e.g., Field, supra note 173, at 890 n.30 ("Because federal common law applies in
state as well as federal court..., an argument can be made that it should apply in the first instance
in state court, just as in federal district court. In theory a state judge would recognize federal
common law if she believed the United States Supreme Court would recognize it. And the
contention that it is applicable would be reviewable by the United States Supreme Court, whether it
prevailed below or not." (citation omitted)).
353. Interestingly, new empirical research suggests the Supreme Court is showing declining
interest in hearing business law cases. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The
Supreme Court and PrivateLaw: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1571 (2004) (noting how the U.S. Supreme Court is showing a declining tendency to adjudicate
private law disputes, notably in the securities regulation and antitrust arenas).
354. Different portions of a case could be reviewed in different court systems. Some forms of
multijurisdictional adjudication already exist; for example, federal certification of state law
questions or federal collateral review of state decisions through habeas corpus petitions. Friedman
suggests an integrated state and federal adjudication process, whereby individual cases could have
separate issues decided by the appropriate court through sequencing or reference. See Friedman,
supra note 345, at 1272, 1274.
355. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, States in a Federal System: The Unitary Executive and State
Administration of Federal Law, 45 KAN. L. REv. 1075 (1997); see also Weiser, Constitutional
Architecture, supra note 323, at 707 ("Constructing a constitutional architecture for cooperative
federalism requires a new vision not only of federal-state relations, but also of the nature of
separation of powers law.").
356. See Seligman, The New CorporateLaw, supra note 331.
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357
given rise to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases.,
My goal here is simply a small beginning to a new conversation about
the intersection of federalism and corporate governance. As Judith
Resnik notes, we should "aspire to a conversation within law that relies
less on preexisting categories and that searches among evolving
practices to learn something new about federalism in the United
States. 358

V.

CONCLUSION

The great irony is that over the past century, lawmakers have used
everything but core corporate law to stem scandal and improve corporate
governance-securities law, criminal law, and exchange listing
requirements, to name a few. 35 9 To become relevant again, corporate law
must first be delayered and simplified. Simply using temporary bandages
in reaction to scandal only leads to recurring problems.36 °
Rather than these baroque facades, minimalism should be the order
of the day. Indeed, lost amid this sea of reform is one basic and
surprisingly overlooked fact: the traditional base of corporate lawfiduciary obligations-has been eviscerated. The rhetoric of corporate
law cleverly sets its "standards of review" well below desirable
"standards of conduct." Seemingly impressive obligations such as the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty are thus enfeebled to become very
weak checks on managers. The result has been state common law that
overwhelmingly defers to management interests. An analogous problem
is the fixation that corporate doctrine has on directors, when in reality,
the modern corporation is run by its officers. Simply put, "standards of
review" must become congruent with "standards of conduct" in
corporate law, like they are in other areas of law. And these standards
must squarely apply to officers.
Arguably an even more interesting question becomes how to elicit
these reforms. Federalization of corporate law is too crude a method.
Indeed, preempting state laws often has, at best, mixed results. Maybe
states themselves will one day realize that contractarian corporate law is
unworkable, as evidenced by endless cycles of corporate scandal. Or
357. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
358. Judith Resnik, Federalism'sOptions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 465, 473 (1996).
359. See, e.g., Leonard Orland, Corporate Misconduct vs. CriminalBehavior, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2004, at A29.
360. Cf Ackerman, supra note 318, at 447 ("Many a redundant statute is enacted because there
is a political itch that needs to be scratched. In such cases, what is needed is not more law, but more
effective enforcement of existing law.").
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perhaps at least states other than Delaware will pay less deference to the
"internal affairs" doctrine and regulate corporations incorporated out-ofstate more aggressively. These possibilities, while theoretically
attractive, are unlikely given states' vested interests in maintaining the
current system. No one wants to move first.
The approach I have proposed is one of cooperative federalism: the
federal government would impose minimum fiduciary standards, but
allow individualized implementation at the state level. Analogizing to
existing paradigms where federal legislation has been left to
implementation by state agencies, I suggest under a reverse-Erie
analysis, that state courts interpret these federal minimum standards. The
articulation of federal common law by states courts, in and of itself,
engenders a series of exciting questions for future debate.
In sum, existing attempts to reform corporate law have merely
added unnecessary layers to doctrine and created a welter of confusing
standards that conflate corporations and securities regulation. A better
approach would be to reinvigorate fiduciary obligations within the
framework of cooperative federalism.
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